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CONTRACTS between firms and consumers are regulated ex- 
Ctensively. Courts and legislatures prohibit the use of certain 
terms, require the use of others, and, if firms make appropriate 
disclosures, permit the use of still others. Decisionmakers and com- 
mentators often justify this regulation on the ground that "imper- 
Imperfect Information 
fect information" exists in consumer markets. They seldom distin- 
guish, however, the differing forms of imperfect information, nor 
do they appreciate the various normative implications that attach 
to each of these forms. This article attempts to clarify the imper- 
fect information justification for regulation as it applies to contract 
terms. 
Imperfect information that may affect contract terms occurs in 
three forms. First, consumers may be uninformed about the risks 
that these terms allocate, making them unable to choose terms 
that correctly reflect their preferences. Firms are said to exploit 
this ignorance by degrading contract quality. For example, if con- 
sumers believe products to be more reliable than they in fact are, 
consumers will accept warranty disclaimers too readily, and firms 
will respond by using disclaimers too frequently. Second, consum- 
ers may be unaware of the array of prices and terms that the firms 
in a market can offer. Consumers who lack this information may 
accept poor bargains because they do not know that better ones 
exist, and firms consequently will have little incentive to offer bet- 
ter deals because these will not increase sales. Third, consumers 
may not understand the legal relationships that their purchase 
contracts create because they do not read the language in those 
contracts. Firms have an incentive to exploit this ignorance by us- 
ing "hidden" terms that will disadvantage consumers if circum- 
stances cause these terms to be invoked. 
The analysis below assumes that this third form of imperfect in- 
formation is absent-that consumers always know what their con- 
tracts say. This assumption limits the scope of our conclusions, but 
the limitation is less serious than is commonly supposed, for the 
problem that the third form of imperfect information creates is 
overstated. Consumers may not read an entire contract, yet still 
know what much of it does. Moreover, evidence suggests that con- 
sumers know generally how they are affected by important 
terms-those dealing with price or governing risks that materialize 
often or cause serious harm when they do materialize. It is there- 
fore worthwhile to analyze cases in which consumers know that 
particular terms exist but either cannot make correct choices re- 
specting these terms or are ignorant of the full range of choices 
that the market offers.' 
The assumption that all consumers know what the contract says is weaker than it 
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Imperfect information about the risks being allocated and im- 
perfect information about market opportunities both imply that 
firms will respond poorly to consumer preferences. A focus on the 
latter form of imperfect information, however, yields insights that 
differ strikingly from those derived from focusing on the former 
type. Emphasis on imperfect information about risks implies two 
types of regulation: (1) firms should be required to explain matters 
to consumers so consumers can choose correctly, or (2) firms 
should be prohibited from degrading contract quality through dis- 
claimers or similar risk-shifting terms. If consumers are instead ig- 
norant of market opportunities, firms may respond by degrading 
contract quality. We show, however, that firms are much more 
likely to react to this second form of imperfect information by sup- 
plying those contract terms that consumers prefer, though at 
supracompetitive prices.2 Hence, even when consumers are suffi- 
ciently informed about risks to choose contract terms correctly and 
are getting the contract terms they want, an information problem 
may exist: firms could be charging supracompetitive prices for 
seems. As we later show, if consumers who care enough about purchase choices to shop for 
favorable deals know the term at issue and if there are enough such consumers, markets will 
respond as if all consumers were aware of that term. Part III briefly considers cases in which 
not enough consumers shop to generate the best outcome and in which the nonshoppers are 
ignorant of contract content. Researchers also show that consumers possess considerable 
awareness of warranty terms. See Darden & Rao, A Linear Covariate Model of Warranty 
Attitudes and Behaviors, 16 J. Mktg. Research 466 (1979); Whitford, Strict Products Liabil- 
ity and the Automobile Industry: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 83. Claims 
that consumers are unaware of creditors' rights to repossess on default when security inter- 
ests exist or that consumers do not know the prices of goods they buy are understandably 
rare. A consumer makes many transactions over the course of a life and is on close terms 
with others who engage in commercial activity. Hence, consumers can develop considerable 
knowledge about contract content if there is overlap in the legal substance of the contracts 
that these consumers make. Such overlap seemingly exists. For example, purchase money 
security interests and repair and replacement warranty clauses assume similar forms in both 
sales of cars and sales of refrigerators. It therefore seems plausible to suppose that most 
consumers know what the important terms in their contracts achieve. These terms are the 
subject of this article. 
2 Recent articles assuming that imperfect information adversely affects consumer con- 
tracts and suggesting extensive regulation of contract content include Davis, Revamping 
Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1333 (1982); Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: 
An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173 (1983). These articles fail to distinguish 
clearly between ignorance of market opportunity sets and ignorance of contract content. Yet 
firms are much less likely to degrade contract quality in response to ignorance of available 
market alternatives than in response to ignorance of what risks the contract allocates. Con- 
sequently, the recommendations that these articles make rest more heavily on the premise 
that consumers are ignorant of contract terms than the authors appear to suppose. 
Imperfect Information 
terms in response to consumer ignorance of market opportunities. 
Conventional legal analysis completely overlooks this problem. 
Supracompetitive pricing is not only an overlooked information 
problem in markets for contract terms, but is often the only prob- 
lem serious enough to justify regulatory concern. This is because 
the incorrect choice problem arises only in a limited set of cases. If 
consumers' mistakes regarding the risks contract terms allocate 
fluctuate randomly around true values in an unbiased way, firms 
will behave as if consumers choose correctly. If consumers are pes- 
simistic-systematically overstating the risks associated with 
purchase decisions-firms will often act as if consumer choices are 
correct. Also, pessimism causes consumers to demand more protec- 
tion, in the form of favorable contract terms, than their better in- 
formed selves would choose; such overprotection is not thought to 
raise serious policy problems. Firms will reduce contract quality in 
undesirable ways only if consumers systematically understate the 
risks associated with purchase choices. Consumers may be "opti- 
mistic" in this way if they lack data about risks or if they mis- 
process relevant data so as to underestimate its adverse implica- 
tions. In most cases, neither possibility is likely. Consumers have 
incentives to become informed about important risks, and the evi- 
dence indicates that they often act upon these incentives.3 More- 
over, an analysis of the psychological literature dealing with cogni- 
tive error suggests that consumers in the aggregate seldom 
misprocess product-related data such that they act optimistically.4 
The principal exception to these conclusions involves inexpensive, 
frequently purchased products that cause serious personal harm in 
rare cases, such as a soda bottle that explodes. We show that the 
purchasers of these products are unlikely to search for information 
about the low risk of harm and may respond optimistically to 
whatever information about this risk comes their way. 
That few cases fit within this exception suggests that imperfect 
information about market opportunities has considerably greater 
normative significance than imperfect information in its other as- 
pects. Consequently, regulatory schemes designed to resolve infor- 
mation problems should differ significantly from the ones now in 
place. Decisionmakers ought to "improve" contract quality by ban- 
s See infra text accompanying notes 73-76. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 77-101. 
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ning contract terms less frequently than they do now. Instead, they 
should attempt to identify and prevent supracompetitive pricing 
for the most frequently used contract terms. Because comparison 
shopping reduces prices, decisionmakers can best implement this 
latter goal by providing consumers with explanations of transac- 
tions and by lowering the costs of comparing the prices and terms 
that firms offer. 
In Part I, the article briefly summarizes current regulatory re- 
sponses to imperfect information as it is thought to affect contract 
terms. Part II sets out our model of a market for warranties; Part 
III then sets out a security interest model. Warranty and security 
interest terms allocate important risks between consumers and 
firms in very different ways. Therefore, policy implications drawn 
from an analysis of these terms probably generalize to other terms 
in consumer contracts. Part IV next asks whether these implica- 
tions continue to hold when certain key assumptions that underlie 
them are relaxed. For example, our model of a warranty market 
supposes that consumers know the odds that products will be de- 
fective. We drop this assumption in Part IV and analyze the con- 
sumer optimism question just described. Part V then considers and 
rejects additional theories of the possible effects of imperfect infor- 
mation and sets out several recommendations for increasing com- 
parison shopping for contract terms. 
Throughout this article, we assume that competitive outcomes in 
markets for contract terms are normatively desirable. This premise 
follows naturally from concern with imperfect information. Imper- 
fect information is a species of market imperfection that enables 
firms to charge supracompetitive prices or impose unwanted terms 
on consumers. Regulatory responses designed to provide consum- 
ers with information or ameliorate the effects of its absence5 must 
therefore assume that competitive outcomes are desirable. More- 
over, when a market is in competitive equilibrium, firms provide 
goods and contract terms at the lowest possible cost consistent 
with the continued existence of these firms. Thus, assuming a 
6 Many of these regulatory initiatives are discussed and analyzed in Beals, Craswell & 
Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & Econ. 491 (1981); 
Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal 
and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630, 666-82 (1979); Trebilcock & Dewees, Judi- 
cial Control of Standard Form Contracts, in The Economic Approach to Law 93 (P. Bur- 
rows & C. Veljanovski eds. 1981). 
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given distribution of wealth, consumers cannot do better than 
purchase in competitive markets.6 
The economic and psychological theory relevant to the perform- 
ance of markets for contract terms is relatively primitive: our mod- 
els of these markets, for instance, are the only formal ones which 
assume that consumers cannot costlessly inform themselves about 
the offerings of different firms. Hence, our policy conclusions 
should be taken more as serious suggestions than as hard recom- 
mendations. Still, policy suggestions grounded in theory seem an 
advance over the atheoretical intuitions that now influence regula- 
tion of contract terms. 
6 A fuller justification of the view that the state should intervene in markets on informa- 
tion grounds only when noncompetitive equilibria occur is provided in Schwartz & Wilde, 
supra note 5, at 635-39, 666-71. We do not discuss two possible objections to this premise. 
The first is that poor consumers may prefer to yield contract protections so that they may 
buy better food or decent shelter; to describe market outcomes that reflect such preferences 
as desirable is morally wrong. This objection is irrelevant to our analysis. The poor consum- 
ers in the illustration are assumed to make informed choices, and we are concerned here 
only with the question when the existence of uninformed choices should lead to state regula- 
tion. Requiring firms to provide better contracts would, in any event, not help consumers 
put to the choice between food or shelter and such contracts. These consumers would in- 
stead be made worse off by the requirement because they prefer the former but are com- 
pelled to take the latter. The wealth distribution concern that generates this objection is 
better solved by transfer payments to poor consumers or by subsidizing the production of 
particular contract terms. The latter possibility is discussed in Schwartz, A Reexamination 
of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1053, 1063 (1977). 
A second set of objections to our premise that competitive equilibria are prima facie desir- 
able follows from the view that it is morally problematic for the state to give controlling 
weight to presently held preferences. Initially, such preferences may be "adaptive." An 
adaptive preference reflects a more or less unconscious adjustment to evil social conditions. 
For example, persons may come to prefer discipline as a way of making tyranny psychologi- 
cally tolerable. Such preferences have little normative value. See, e.g., Elster, Sour 
Grapes-Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants, in Utilitarianism and Beyond 219 (A. Sen 
& B. Williams eds. 1982). Similarly, people may sometimes consume in a manner inconsis- 
tent with their true best interests; they may, that is, consume excessively or without regard 
to the effect of their consumption decisions on others whose interests they profess to hold 
important. This could occur because the ideology of a market economy regards self-inter- 
ested consumption as desirable behavior and thereby may prevent persons from recognizing 
that their market preferences are inconsistent with their real wants and needs. See R. 
Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory (1981). We make the perhaps strong assumption that 
these varieties of false consciousness do not exist. We do not know how to distinguish "ordi- 
nary" preferences for contract terms from adaptive or otherwise false preferences. Given 
this inability, the question is whether to regard particular preferences as provisionally true 
or false. We regard them as true because this is more consistent with a respect for the 
autonomy of persons. Later in the article, we discuss a final difficulty with allowing present 
preferences to control, that they may be unstable over time. See infra text accompanying 
notes 111-14. 
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I. REGULATION OF CONTRACT TERMS 
Decisionmakers respond to imperfect information either by re- 
quiring disclosure or by banning disfavored contract clauses. Dis- 
closure regulation typically seeks to explain the individual transac- 
tion to each consumer rather than help the consumer compare 
contract terms offered by different firms. For example, regulations 
under the Truth in Lending Act7 require disclosure of "the circum- 
stances under which a finance charge may be imposed . .. includ- 
ing an explanation of whether or not any time period exists within 
which any credit extended may be repaid without incurring a fi- 
nance charge"; such disclosure must be made clearly, conspicu- 
ously, and in meaningful sequence.8 Similarly, regulations imple- 
menting the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act9 require firms to 
provide a "step-by-step explanation of the procedure which the 
consumer should follow in order to obtain performance of any war- 
ranty obligation."'0 
Regulation of the substantive terms of transactions is also com- 
mon. Six states ban warranty disclaimers in all sales of consumer 
goods," and the Magnuson-Moss Act bans such disclaimers when- 
ever a firm makes a written express warranty respecting the prod- 
uct.12 Almost all states have adopted strict tort liability for product 
defects, so that firms must warrant against defects that cause per- 
sonal injury or property damage.'8 Moreover, when firms promise 
to repair or replace defective parts of consumer products, courts 
commonly require them to repair such products quickly or replace 
them; the promise to attempt to repair parts is thus converted into 
7 15 U.S.C. ?? 1601-1667e (1982). 
8 Truth in Lending, 12 C.F.R. ?? 226.6(a)(1)-(3), 226.17(a) (1983). 
9 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. ?? 
2301-2312 (1982). 
10 Disclosure of Written Consumer Product Warranty Terms and Conditions, 16 C.F.R. ? 
701.3(5) (1983). 
" Kan. Stat. Ann. ? 50-639(a) (1976 & Supp. 1982); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, ? 2-316(5) 
(1982); Md. Com. Law Code Ann. ? 2-316.1 (Supp. 1982); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106, ? 
2-316A (West Supp. 1983); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9A, ? 2-316(5) (Supp. 1983); W. Va. Code ? 
46A-1-107 (1980). 
" 15 U.S.C. ? 2308(a) (1982) ("No supplier may disclaim or modify ... any implied war- 
ranty to a consumer with respect to a consumer product if (1) such supplier makes any 
written warranty to the consumer with respect to such consumer product . .."). 
", See Restatement (Second) of Torts ? 402A (1965). 
[Vol. 69:1387 1394 
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a warranty to supply a well-functioning whole.14 States are begin- 
ning to adopt this rule by statute.15 The Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code prevents sellers from taking security interests in consumer 
goods other than purchase money security interests,'6 and several 
states have either adopted the Code or passed similar statutes.'7 
The Federal Trade Commission also recently agreed to limit the 
taking of security interests in consumer goods.l8 The existence of 
imperfect information is often used to justify all these regulatory 
schemes. In addition, most findings of unconscionability depend 
largely on the apparent presence of uninformed consumers.ls 
Disclosure requirements and the banning of contract terms ap- 
parently assume that comparison shopping will seldom improve 
consumer welfare because the former does not aim seriously at in- 
creasing the amount of comparison shopping that occurs, and the 
latter eliminates consumer choice altogether. Current schemes for 
regulating contract terms also assume that what a consumer learns 
in one transaction will not be applied in others like it.20 Statutes 
and legal doctrines that ban contract terms additionally suppose 
that firms typically exploit the existence of imperfect information 
by offering terms that consumers would reject were they properly 
informed. This article argues that all of these assumptions are 
wrong or problematic, at least as applied to terms likely to be sig- 
nificant to consumers. 
14 See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, Commercial Transactions: Principles and Policies 200-06 
(1982). 
'5 Cal. Civ. Code ? 1793.2(d) (West Supp. 1983); 1982 Conn. Acts 287 (Reg. Sess.). 
16 Unif. Consumer Credit Code ? 3.301(1) (1974). 
17 For examples of these laws, see Schwartz, The Enforceability of Security Interests in 
Consumer Goods, 26 J.L. & Econ. 117, 123 nn.22-24 (1983). Restrictions on the taking of 
security interests are often justified on noninformational grounds, such as that creditors 
allegedly fail to maximize the proceeds from repossessed collateral. The article just cited 
argues that such justifications are unpersuasive. The security interest legislation referred to 
in the text is therefore evaluated here in informational terms. 
18 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1124, at 86 (July 21, 1983) (barring certain 
collection practices). 
'1 See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1076-82. 
20 See Landers & Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 
711 (1979); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 5, at 677. 
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II. WARRANTY MARKETS 
A. Conventional Views 
We have already outlined the three forms imperfect information 
may take. Sophisticated conventional explanations of the positive 
and normative aspects of warranties suppose that imperfect infor- 
mation in two of those forms is absent: consumers are assumed to 
read warranties and know market opportunities perfectly. These 
explanations differ in their treatment of the other form of imper- 
fect information-that consumers may lack information about the 
risks particular terms allocate. "Signalling" theories suppose con- 
sumers to be poorly informed about product quality. "Comparative 
advantage" explanations assume the opposite, but sometimes con- 
sider how their conclusions would change if consumers were unin- 
formed about the risk of product defects. Authors of both types of 
explanations seldom examine the relationship between their as- 
sumptions and their results; this failing obscures the dependence 
of these results on the assumption that consumers are perfectly in- 
formed about prices and terms. Accordingly, we begin by analyzing 
the role this assumption plays in conventional warranty theories. 
This serves as a useful prelude to our analysis of how imperfect 
consumer knowledge of market opportunities affects warranty 
coverage. 
1. Signalling Explanations 
Proponents of signalling theory assert that a warranty "signals" 
to consumers the quality of a firm's product.21 Such explanations 
rest on four assumptions: (1) Consumers cannot distinguish among 
competing products based on their likelihood of failure; (2) Con- 
sumers believe that product quality correlates positively with the 
extent and duration of warranty coverage; (3) The cost to firms of 
making warranties varies inversely with product quality-the more 
likely a product will fail, the more expensive it will be to comply 
with warranties for that product; (4) If firms do not signal their 
1 For representative explanations of signalling, see Grossman, The Informational Role of 
Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & Econ. 461, 470-77 
(1981); Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 Rev. 
Econ. Stud. 561, 569-71 (1977). See also Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product War- 
ranty, 90 Yale L.J. 1297, 1303-07, 1326-27 (1981) (criticizing signalling theory). 
[Vol. 69:1387 1396 
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level of product quality to consumers, the consumers will assume 
that average quality in a market is relatively low. Were consumers 
to suppose average quality to be high, firms would exploit them by 
selling low quality products at high quality prices. 
Based on these four assumptions, warranty coverage should cor- 
relate positively with product quality. Firms with products whose 
quality is better than the low expectation consumers start with 
have an incentive to signal this better quality. According to as- 
sumption (2), they can best do this by making "strong" warranties. 
Assumption (3) then implies that firms with poor products will be 
unable to duplicate these warranty "signals" because the cost of 
complying with them would be too high. Therefore, if product 
quality varies, a variety of warranties should exist, each of them 
signalling the quality of the product it accompanies. 
Signalling explanations necessarily assume that consumers know 
prices and contract terms well because firms have no incentive to 
send signals that will not be received. Consequently, signalling 
models often add a fifth assumption, that consumers can costlessly 
observe the prices and terms of every firm in the market. This 
"zero search cost" assumption is always false in fact, and its falsity 
seems at least partly responsible for the major difficulty with sig- 
nalling explanations-their inconsistency with the data. Three 
counterexamples to the theory should suffice to demonstrate this 
inconsistency. First, signalling theory predicts that firms with more 
durable products will make warranties that cover longer time peri- 
ods. In fact, actual warranties in given markets generally cover 
identical time periods, which in turn are considerably shorter than 
the useful life of the products they accompany.22 Second, signalling 
theory implies that warranties in commercial markets either will 
not exist or will differ substantially from those in consumer mar- 
kets. According to the theory, firms make warranties to inform 
otherwise ignorant consumer buyers about product quality, while 
many commercial buyers are presumably well informed about 
product quality. Yet warranties in commercial markets seem as 
common as those in consumer markets and take quite similar 
forms.23 Third, the theory predicts a strong positive correlation be- 
tween warranty coverage and product reliability. That correlation 
" See Priest, supra note 21, at 1328-31. 
" See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 14, at 189-94, 196-206. 
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seems difficult to detect in practice. Frequency of repair data 
sometimes shows wide variations among firms, while the products 
themselves sell under similar or identical warranties.24 
To summarize, signalling explanations do not account for impor- 
tant facts about markets for warranty terms and, for this and other 
reasons,25 are not useful for policy purposes. Moreover, the zero 
search cost assumption seemingly contributes to the theory's in- 
ability to explain the data. Analysis of signalling explanations thus 
suggests that warranties may be better understood if that assump- 
tion is abandoned. 
2. Comparative Advantage Explanations 
Comparative advantage theorists argue that warranty coverage 
reflects the comparative advantages of firms and consumers in re- 
ducing the costs of, or insuring against, product defects.26 Large 
consumer appliances such as refrigerators offer a good illustration 
of how comparative advantage determines warranty content. The 
theory in this context rests on six assumptions: (1) Firms can re- 
duce the costs of defects in refrigerator motors more cheaply than 
consumers because firms have more expertise regarding motors 
and benefit from economies of scale in buying repair tools; (2) 
Consumers can better ensure the durability of refrigerator doors 
and shelves because these items are best preserved through careful 
use; (3) Consumers are perfectly informed as to the risk of product 
defects and know what steps are necessary to reduce this risk; (4) 
Search costs are zero-consumers can costlessly observe every 
24 See, e.g., Garvin, Quality on the Line, 61 Harv. Bus. Rev. 564 (1983). 
25 The welfare effects of signalling equilibria are very hard to evaluate. If and when they 
exist, these equilibria reflect only the sustained confirmation of consumers' beliefs. For ex- 
ample, if consumers believe that warranty coverage correlates positively with product dura- 
bility and if sellers of more durable products find it cheaper to make warranties than do 
sellers of less durable products, the former sellers have an incentive to make more extensive 
warranties. If they actually do so, warranty coverage will vary directly with durability. In 
this event, the informational content that consumers attribute to the warranty signal is con- 
firmed by the signals they see so that a signalling equilibrium could exist. This equilibrium 
would be efficient, however, only if the increased costs to firms of sending such warranty 
signals are less than the welfare gains to consumers of being able to make more accurate 
distinctions about product durability. This comparison is very difficult to make. 
26 Early but still interesting comparative advantage explanations are found in G. Cala- 
bresi, The Costs of Accidents 161-73 (1970); McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Impli- 
cations, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3, 25-34 (1970); Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 Bell J. 
Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1973). 
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price and contract term that all firms in the market do or could 
offer; (5) Consumers minimize net purchase costs; (6) Firms maxi- 
mize profits. 
Under these assumptions, firms will offer the optimal refrigera- 
tor warranty. Assumptions (1) and (2) imply that product defect 
costs are minimized if firms assume the risk of defective motors 
but shift the risk of defective doors and shelves to consumers. Be- 
cause, according to assumption (3), consumers know the risk of 
product defects, they will recognize that this risk allocation mini- 
mizes their costs; and by assumption (5), they will prefer it to any 
other risk allocation that firms could offer. Because consumers can 
costlessly search for the best warranty according to assumption (4), 
each firm knows that by offering it, the firm will necessarily take 
sales from rivals who offer different warranties. Assumption (6) 
then ensures that every firm will offer the optimal warranty. 
Comparative advantage explanations of warranty content seem 
plausible because consumers and firms do have differing abilities 
to reduce or insure against product risks. Also, the assumptions 
that consumers act as if they minimize costs and firms act as if 
they maximize profits are consistent with a very large amount of 
data. In addition, these explanations account for certain warranty- 
related behavior. For example, firms are not required to repair or 
replace defective parts of consumer products, but only to pay dam- 
ages should such defects arise.7 Nevertheless, firms often agree to 
repair or replace. The theory predicts this result because repairs of 
new products by firms commonly are less costly than repairs by 
consumers. 
Comparative advantage explanations, however, cannot generate 
unambiguous explanations of warranty behavior when their infor- 
mational assumptions-(3) and (4) above-are relaxed. Yet these 
assumptions must be relaxed, for they are false in fact. The diffi- 
culty this causes is best illustrated by examining the most recent 
major comparative advantage explanation, that of Professor 
George Priest.28 We show that the conclusions Professor Priest 
drew respecting warranty content do not follow from his theory. 
Although some of these conclusions, we later argue,29 are sustaina- 
27 U.C.C. ?? 2-712 to -715 (1978). 
28 See Priest, supra note 21. 
29 See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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ble in a richer theoretical framework, it is essential for policy pur- 
poses that this framework be built because it is very hard to test 
warranty theories empirically. 
Professor Priest's theory rests on the six assumptions set out 
previously and one more-that some consumers want broader war- 
ranty coverage than others. These seven assumptions imply that 
actual warranty coverage should be alike in the ways consumer 
preferences are alike and different in the ways those preferences 
differ. For example, virtually all consumers want coverage against 
defects in refrigerator motors, so all firms should offer basic cover- 
age against such defects. On the other hand, some consumers 
(those with large families, for instance) might prefer stronger than 
usual warranty coverage, so at least some firms should offer rela- 
tively extensive warranties. When Professor Priest examined actual 
warranties, he observed patterns of homo- and heterogeneity in 
warranty coverage that seemed consistent with his theory, but in 
some cases the sample sizes were small and occasional counterex- 
amples existed.30 
Professor Priest concluded that the coverage he observed was 
probably optimal, but the evidence alone cannot sustain this claim. 
Suppose that consumers are imperfectly informed respecting the 
risk of product defects. Such consumers could still have heteroge- 
neous preferences for warranty protection: some may mistakenly 
think they need broad warranties while others could mistakenly 
think they need narrow ones. If firms maximize profits and search 
costs are zero, firms will still offer the warranties that these con- 
sumers want. The warranties will, however, be inefficient.31 Thus, 
Professor Priest's observation of varied warranty coverage cannot 
establish his claim that consumer warranties probably reflect 
"manufacturer and consumer investments to optimize product ser- 
vices."32 To sustain this claim, he must show that firms always 
30 Priest, supra note 21, at 1347. 
1S In a competitive equilibrium involving incorrect consumer choices, firms nevertheless 
make zero profits; consumers, however, are less well off than they could be because they are 
purchasing the wrong warranties. Hence, it is possible to make the consumers better off, by 
providing them with the information to choose correctly, while making firms no worse off, 
for they will also earn zero profits in the "correct" competitive equilibrium. A state of af- 
fairs in which some persons can be made better off, at least in theory, while no one would be 
made worse off is inefficient. 
32 Priest, supra note 21, at 1347. 
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know what warranties consumers actually need and will not sell 
consumers the wrong warranty. Alternatively, he must indepen- 
dently support his assumption that consumers accurately value 
risks or show that this assumption is irrelevant to efficiency 
analysis. 
In addition, the warranties that Priest observed may not cor- 
rectly reflect consumer preferences for warranty coverage, whether 
those preferences were based on mistaken or accurate assessments 
of risk. Suppose that consumers no longer face zero search costs 
but have identical preferences for warranty coverage. If the re- 
maining assumptions that comparative advantage explanations 
make are retained, the economic literature on search theory sug- 
gests that firms may still offer diverse warranty terms. Analysts 
working in this literature commonly suppose all firms to sell a ho- 
mogeneous product under a sales contract that has only one term, 
the price. Consumers must have identical preferences as to this 
term: they want it to be as low as possible. Thus, all consumers 
want to purchase at the competitive price, which by definition is 
the lowest price at which firms can stay in business. A standard 
result in this literature, however, is that price diversity can exist 
when it is costly for consumers to inform themselves of the prices 
that different firms charge even though all consumers prefer the 
same price.33 Inferring that consumers prefer different prices be- 
cause different prices exist would plainly be a mistake; the variety 
in prices can only be the result of positive search costs. 
In the following section, we extend this standard result to war- 
ranty terms, showing that when search costs are positive and all 
consumers prefer the same warranty, it is theoretically possible for 
firms not to offer it. The diversity in warranty coverage that Pro- 
fessor Priest observed could thus have been caused either by heter- 
ogeneous consumer preferences, as he supposed, or by positive 
search costs. If search costs actually explain Priest's data, his con- 
clusion that warranty coverage accurately reflected consumer pref- 
erences is incorrect. To exclude this possibility, one must analyze 
how warranty markets behave when consumers face positive search 
costs. Neither Professor Priest nor any other comparative advan- 
33 The search theoretic literature is reviewed in Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Informa- 
tion, Monopolistic Competition, and Public Policy, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1982, at 18 (papers 
and proceedings of the 94th annual meeting of the American Economic Association). 
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tage theorist has made such an analysis. Thus, although compara- 
tive advantage explanations correctly identify important influences 
on warranty content, it is essential to explore the comparative ad- 
vantage idea in a world of positive search costs. 
B. A Model of a Warranty Market 
1. A Simple Search Equilibrium Model for Price Terms 
To develop the logic that underlies our analysis of warranty mar- 
kets, we will begin with a search equilibrium model involving only 
the price term. The word "search" refers to the process by which 
consumers become informed about the products, prices, and terms 
that firms offer. The object of this class of models is to describe 
the outcomes ("equilibria") that markets reach when consumers 
seek information in particular ways (pursue "search strategies") 
and firms pursue specified profit-maximizing strategies.34 An un- 
derstanding of these models is essential to anyone concerned with 
the effect that imperfect information has on the way markets 
perform. 
Our relatively simple price search model rests on seven assump- 
tions.35 (1) A large number of firms exist. (2) These firms sell the 
same product, all of whose features are observable before purchase. 
Hence, no uncertainty about product quality exists. (3) Firms do 
not advertise, but instead inform consumers when they visit the 
firms. (4) Consumers are numerous; all will purchase no more than 
one unit of the product. (5) All consumers have the same "limit 
price," so that every consumer will buy if he or she observes a price 
equal to or less than this limit, but none will buy at prices above 
34 These models use the Nash equilibrium concept. Each actor in a market is assumed to 
pursue a specified strategy designed to achieve a particular objective, such as minimizing 
purchase costs or maximizing profits. A set of strategies is in a Nash equilibrium when no 
actor has an incentive to alter his or her strategy, given that other actors continue to pursue 
their strategies. Because no one has an incentive to change, a market outcome described by 
such a Nash equilibrium set of strategies is stable. Conversely, when at least one actor has 
an incentive to alter his or her strategy, given that other actors pursue their strategies un- 
changed, the resulting market outcome is unstable; it is not in equilibrium. From a public 
policy viewpoint, the equilibria in a model reflect the model's predictions of what the world 
is like. They are thus useful to decisionmakers in understanding and evaluating market out- 
comes. See R. Luce & H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions 170-79 (1957); Schwartz & Wilde, 
supra note 5, at 640-41. 
36 The model is set out in Wilde & Schwartz, Equilibrium Comparison Shopping, 46 Rev. 
Econ. Stud. 543, 545-51 (1979). 
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the limit. (6) Consumers inform themselves about prices by using a 
"fixed sample size" search strategy:36 each consumer, before enter- 
ing the market, decides how many firms to visit, then visits all 
firms in the sample before purchasing at the lowest price observed, 
if that price is no greater than the limit price. (7) Some consumers 
have sample sizes of one-they visit only one firm before buy- 
ing-while others have sample sizes of two or more. We label these 
consumers "nonshoppers" and "shoppers," respectively. 
Such models raise three questions: First, what results does the 
model yield? Second, are the model's assumptions sufficiently 
plausible or its predictions sufficiently confirmed for these results 
to be taken seriously? Third, if the results do deserve serious con- 
sideration, what are their implications? 
A major result of this model is that the only possible equilibrium 
in which all the firms charge the same price occurs when that price 
is competitive. To see why, first suppose that all the firms in the 
market charge the same price, "po," which is less than the common 
limit price, "PL," and greater than the competitive price "p*." 
Then let one firm lower its price a small amount below p,. This 
price-cutter will sell to all nonshoppers who visit it; it will also sell 
to all shoppers who visit because its price will be the lowest one 
the shoppers observe. Thus, price-cutting will be a profitable strat- 
egy for the firm if all other firms continued to charge the old price, 
PO. But these firms have the same incentive to reduce their prices 
below po. Consequently, po cannot be the equilibrium price be- 
cause at least some firms would undercut it. The competitive price, 
p*, could be an equilibrium price because no firm would sell below 
it. This price by definition equals each firm's minimum average 
cost, which means that revenue from a sale just equals the lowest 
cost necessary to generate that sale. Because price cuts below this 
point must produce losses, firms have no incentive to reduce prices 
below the competitive level. 
If prices are at that level, no firm will raise its price unless too 
few consumers comparison shop. Let one firm consider raising its 
price above the competitive price, p*. This firm would continue to 
sell to nonshoppers who visit it if its new price does not exceed the 
36 The formal model assumes that consumers gather all their information from shopping, 
so that both communication with other consumers and repeat purchases do not provide 
sources of information about product quality. 
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common price limit, PL. Shoppers will not buy at this price, how- 
ever, because it will exceed those they see at other firms. Because 
the firm would lose all shoppers' business at any price above p* 
and keep all nonshoppers' business at any price not exceeding PL, 
it would therefore charge the limit price, PL, if it chose to deviate 
from the competitive price. Whether it will deviate thus depends 
on whether the gains from charging PL to nonshoppers exceed the 
lost profits from foregone sales to shoppers. If enough shoppers ex- 
ist, raising prices would be a losing strategy. Therefore, the com- 
petitive price will be the equilibrium price in a particular market if 
enough comparison shopping occurs there. 
If too few comparison shoppers existed to sustain a competitive 
equilibrium, many firms might still charge the competitive price 
because of the pressure the shoppers exert. Other firms, however, 
will find it profitable to sell to a mix of shoppers and nonshoppers 
at supracompetitive prices. In this situation, price dispersion ex- 
ists, though the products sold and consumer preferences are both 
homogeneous. Finally, if very few consumers comparison shop, 
raising prices above the competitive level could be profitable for all 
firms; if sufficiently few shoppers existed, prices would converge 
toward the common limit price, PL. 
Having discussed elsewhere the assumptions that generate these 
results,37 we will comment here only on the assumption that con- 
sumers use a fixed sample size shopping strategy. There are three 
reasons for making this assumption. First, fixed costs to search 
sometimes exist: the main shopping expense could be getting to 
the shopping district. A fixed sample size strategy minimizes these 
fixed costs by spreading them over visits to several stores. Second, 
search sometimes is a consumption activity: consumers who enjoy 
shopping may therefore plan to exhaust a sample of several stores. 
The third reason is more complex. When consumers have limited 
knowledge of the range of prices available to them, they must 
choose either to set a fixed sample of stores or to vary the number 
of stores they visit according to the prices they see. A consumer 
pursuing the latter strategy who visits two stores and sees the same 
price at both might stop searching, believing it unlikely that lower 
prices exist. In contrast, such a consumer who saw two different 
prices might visit several more stores, believing substantial price 
37 See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 5, at 646-48. 
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dispersion to exist. This strategy makes the number of stores vis- 
ited partly a function of the prices observed. Experimental evi- 
dence suggests that using a "sequential rule" of this sort is no easy 
matter; unless consumers know (or can intelligently guess) before- 
hand how much price variability there is, they can shop considera- 
bly less or more than the actual price distribution warrants.38 A 
fixed sample size strategy is less subject to this difficulty and, 
therefore, seems a more sensibly conservative strategy for consum- 
ers to adopt.39 
This simple search model predicts that price diversity sometimes 
will exist in actual markets, and it does. The model also predicts 
that market prices may fall if more consumers can be induced to 
comparison shop. Evidence drawn from actual markets is consis- 
tent with this prediction.40 Accordingly, the model's assumptions 
and predictions seem sufficiently plausible to warrant concern with 
its implications. 
Chief among these implications is that information about market 
choices need not be perfect. A market can be in competitive equi- 
38 See id. at 646-50. 
39 Regarding other important assumptions of the model, one of us has shown elsewhere 
that the model's qualitative results do not change when consumers may purchase more than 
one unit. Sadanand & Wilde, A Generalized Model of Pricing for Homogeneous Goods 
Under Imperfect Information, 49 Rev. Econ. Stud. 229 (1982). These results also obtain if 
each consumer has an individual limit price. In such a case, one could derive a demand 
function for every firm from the distribution of individual limit prices; the model would 
then behave similarly to the model found in Sadanand & Wilde, supra. Search models typi- 
cally do not do this because their results are qualitatively unchanged under the simplifying 
assumption. 
40 Two researchers, for example, provided consumers with comparative price information 
and a weighted index of prices on 65 common food items for supermarkets in a Canadian 
city for a five-week period. Prices in the sample market declined substantially and price 
dispersion decreased during the experimental period, while prices and dispersion were 
largely unaffected in the control market. See Devine & Marion, The Influence of Consumer 
Price Information on Retail Pricing and Consumer Behavior, 61 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 228, 
230-32 (1979). The primary results of this study were confirmed in McCracken, Boynton & 
Blake, The Impact of Comparative Food Price Information on Consumers and Grocery Re- 
tailers: Some Preliminary Findings of a Field Experiment, 16 J. Consumer Aff. 224 (1982). 
Other studies report similar findings. See McNeil, Nevin, Trubek & Miller, Market Discrim- 
ination Against the Poor and the Impact of Consumer Disclosure Laws: The Used Car In- 
dustry, 13 L. & Soc'y Rev. 695 (1979); Russo, Krieser & Miyashita, An Effective Display of 
Unit Price Information, J. Mktg., Apr. 1975, at 11. Several studies also report lower prices 
where price advertising is permitted than where it is not. See Craswell, Tying Requirements 
in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Aspects, 62 B.U.L. Rev. 661, 676 n.63 
(1982) (summarizing studies). 
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librium even though the ratio of comparison shoppers to all con- 
sumers is much less than one. These competitive equilibria are 
best obtained by increasing comparison shopping, for the model 
also shows that greater comparison shopping correlates positively 
with lower prices. The model that generates these conclusions as- 
sumes that firms sell a homogeneous product, but we have argued 
elsewhere that the conclusions also hold when firms may vary 
product quality.41 The next section analyzes the extent to which 
the lessons drawn from this relatively simple model change when 
firms are allowed to vary contract quality. 
2. A Warranty Model42 
This model retains the seven assumptions about firms and con- 
sumers posited in the search equilibrium model43 and adds four 
new ones about consumers. First, we assume that consumers do 
not know in advance which firms offer warranties and which do 
not. Hence, nonshoppers sample one firm at random from among 
all firms before purchasing, while shoppers sample more than one 
firm at random from among all firms. A store visit reveals the 
firm's price and whether it offers a warranty. Consumers are there- 
fore imperfectly informed respecting prices and terms but know 
the contracts of the firms they visit. We denote the ratio of non- 
shoppers to total consumers by "a," and the ratio of shoppers to 
total consumers by "a2," so that a, + a2 = 1. 
Second, consumers differ in their preference for warranties. A 
consumer prefers a warranty, in this model, if the consumer sees 
the product offered with a warranty at the competitive price and 
offered without a warranty at the competitive price, and would 
then purchase the product with the warranty. A consumer there- 
fore is said not to prefer a warranty if he or she would be unwilling 
to pay the lowest possible premium that firms must charge to pro- 
41 Schwartz & Wilde, Competitive Equilibria in Markets for Heterogeneous Search Goods 
Under Imperfect Information: A Theoretical Analysis with Policy Implications, 13 Bell J. 
Econ. 181 (1982). 
42 Technical versions of this model appear in Schwartz & Wilde, Consumer Markets for 
Warranties, Cal. Inst. Tech. Social Science Working Paper No. 445 (1982); Schwartz & 
Wilde, Warranty Markets and Public Policy, 1 J. Information Econ. & Pub. Pol'y 55 (1983). 
The present discussion is meant to make the technical analysis accessible to lawyers and to 
stress its normative implications. 
49 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
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vide warranty protection. 
Third, this model slightly modifies the assumption that all con- 
sumers have the same limit price because a consumer may now buy 
with or without a warranty. Let "hw" be the limit price, or willing- 
ness to pay, for the product with a warranty and "hN" be the limit 
price for the product without a warranty. Here, hw is always 
greater than hN because a warranty is a desirable product feature: 
no consumer would pay more for a product with no contract guar- 
antees than for a product that has such guarantees, even if the 
consumer does not prefer the guarantee at competitive prices. The 
term hw - hN represents a consumer's marginal willingness to pay 
for warranty protection. A consumer prefers a warranty when hw 
- hN> p* - P ', where pw is the competitive price for the product 
with a warranty and pN is the competitive price for the product 
without a warranty. 
The last two assumptions imply that a consumer who prefers a 
warranty at competitive prices will purchase a product without a 
warranty if he or she only sees the product offered without a war- 
ranty, and the price equals or is less than the limit price (hN). Sim- 
ilarly, a consumer who does not prefer warranties will buy the 
product with warranty protection if the consumer sees only war- 
ranties and the price equals or is less than the limit price (hw). 
These limit prices incorporate all relevant information respecting 
consumer preferences. For example, other things equal, the spread 
between hw and hN will be greater if consumers strongly prefer 
warranties. 
Fourth, consumers purchase one unit of a product that has a 
positive probability, r, of breaking and becoming useless; 'r's value 
is known to firms and consumers and does not depend on the care 
with which consumers use the product. Thus, although the product 
can fail, no uncertainty about product quality exists. In the termi- 
nology used here, imperfect information concerning the risks con- 
tracts allocate is absent. 
Respecting the firms in the model, we add four further assump- 
tions. First, firms produce the product with a fixed cost, "F," and a 
constant marginal cost over some range, "c." This marginal cost is 
incurred whether a warranty is made or not. Firms can sell with a 
warranty or without, but cannot do both. Second, a warranty in 
this model consists of a promise, which is always redeemed, to re- 
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place any defective product with a new one at no charge.4 Third, 
offering the product with a warranty does not directly affect each 
firm's marginal cost, but may require additional fixed costs, "F'." 
These additional fixed costs may arise from administrative or 
other expenses that a replacement program could cause. Fourth, 
marginal cost nevertheless increases when a firm sells under war- 
ranty. A firm that sells with a warranty must plan for the replace- 
ment of defective products, and the replacements could also be de- 
fective. Hence, the firm must produce more than one unit to 
"support" a sale of one unit; the total amount that must be pro- 
duced per sale is 1/(1 - r), where ir is the failure probability. 
Then, with a constant marginal cost of production, c, the firm's 
total variable cost if it makes a warranty and sells x units is 
cx/(l - r). Its marginal cost of selling with warranties, called "cw", 
is this total variable cost divided by total effective output, or 
c/(l - r), which is greater than c because ir is positive but less 
than one. Finally, let "s" be the firm's output in competitive equi- 
librium when it sells without warranties. Then, a firm that sells 
with warranties has a total output in competitive equilibrium of 
"Sw", where sw = (1 - lr)s. The output sw is less than s because 
the firm must provide for replacements. 
We are now ready to consider the model's results in two para- 
digm cases. In the first, all consumers prefer warranties. We ana- 
lyze this case because decisionmakers and commentators com- 
monly assert that consumers want more warranty protection than 
markets provide. Thus, we consider what would likely happen if 
every consumer in a market preferred a warranty, but firms were 
allowed to disclaim. In the second paradigm case, we examine the 
opposite situation in which no consumer prefers a warranty. 
a. All Consumers Prefer Warranties 
Three mutually exclusive outcomes are possible when every con- 
sumer prefers warranties. The most desirable of these occurs when 
all firms offer the product with a warranty at the competitive 
price. The likelihood that this happy state of affairs will occur de- 
44 We make this assumption because it is analytically tractable. The making of a warranty 
in the model raises a firm's marginal cost and reduces its effective output because the firm 
must provide for replacements. Any warranty that has these features, such as a promise to 
repair or replace, is captured by our model. 
Imperfect Information 
pends once more on the amount of comparison shopping by con- 
sumers. The logic that underlies this result is similar to that in the 
price-search equilibrium model. Let all firms in the market sell 
with warranties at a price Po > p*, where p* is the competitive 
price. Then every firm has an incentive to cut its price by a small 
amount because it would continue to sell to nonshoppers and cap- 
ture all of the shoppers who visit it. The price-cutting strategy is 
not profitable at prices below the competitive price p*; hence, a 
single price equilibrium can occur only if all firms charge this 
price. If all firms sell with warranties at p*, a firm that wants to 
deviate in the price dimension will charge the limit price hw be- 
cause it will sell only to nonshoppers. This would be an unprofita- 
ble strategy if enough shoppers existed, for then the increased rev- 
enue gained from the nonshoppers would be more than offset by 
the losses resulting from the disappearance of the shoppers. 
A firm also could deviate from a competitive equilibrium in 
which all firms sold with warranties at pw, by offering the product 
without a warranty. This firm too would sell only to nonshoppers, 
for, by assumption, every consumer in the market prefers a war- 
ranty and each shopper would see at least one other firm selling 
with a warranty at pw. Hence, a deviating firm not only would dis- 
claim but also would raise its price to hN-the most consumers 
would pay when not getting a warranty. Again, if enough shoppers 
existed, disclaiming warranties while charging monopoly-i.e., 
limit-prices would be an unprofitable strategy. In summary, then, 
when all consumers prefer warranties and enough consumers com- 
parison shop, the market will provide warranties at competitive 
prices. 
If too few comparison shoppers exist to sustain a competitive 
equilibrium, two possibilities remain: first, all firms will sell with 
warranties but some or all of them will charge prices above the 
competitive level; second, some or all firms will sell without war- 
ranties and charge supracompetitive prices. Which of these out- 
comes occurs depends on whether firms have a comparative advan- 
tage at selling with or without warranties. 
Comparative advantage in this context differs from the compara- 
tive advantage discussed earlier,45 because it is a function not only 
of costs but of demand. We define comparative advantage by refer- 
"4 See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. 
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ence to the number of customers that a firm would need to break 
even when it charged the limit price-the highest price consumers 
would be willing to pay. If, because of a firm's cost structure and 
consumer preferences, that firm would need fewer customers to 
break even when selling at the limit price with a warranty (hw), we 
then say that the firm has a comparative advantage at selling with 
warranties. Similarly, if a firm would need fewer customers to 
break even when selling at the limit price without a warranty (hN), 
the firm has a comparative advantage at selling without 
warranties. 
To understand how this concept of comparative advantage is rel- 
evant, suppose that all firms in the market offer the product with a 
warranty at the competitive price (p*). In this illustration, too few 
comparison shoppers exist to make any deviation from the compet- 
itive price unprofitable. Because a firm that considers deviating 
from this price knows that it will sell only to nonshoppers, it will 
charge the limit price, but it has the option of making a warranty 
and charging hw or disclaiming warranties and charging hN. If the 
firm would need fewer customers to break even when selling at hw, 
it will offer a warranty. This strategy would yield higher profits 
because the firm reaches its break-even point with fewer sales. On 
the other hand, if the firm would need fewer customers to break 
even when selling at hN, the firm will disclaim warranties. In fact, 
when firms have a comparative advantage at selling without war- 
ranties and very few consumers comparison shop, warranties could 
be wholly absent from the market even though every consumer 
preferred them. 
To summarize, firms that have a comparative advantage at sell- 
ing with warranties will not disclaim them in response to a lack of 
comparison shopping. When the comparative advantage runs the 
other way, some firms will disclaim, but, unless comparison shop- 
ping is slight, other firms will offer warranties if consumers prefer 
them. No matter which way the comparative advantage breaks, 
however, firms will respond to a lack of comparison shopping by 
charging supracompetitive prices. 
Because much turns on the notion of comparative advantage, it 
is important to ask what its determinants are. A firm has a com- 
parative advantage at selling with warranties when making a war- 
ranty adds little to the firm's fixed cost (F' equals zero or is small) 
and consumers strongly prefer warranties. If consumers strongly 
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prefer warranties, their limit price for the product with a warranty 
should significantly exceed their limit price for the product with- 
out a warranty. Hence, a firm selling at the limit price will need 
fewer customers to break even when selling with warranties than 
when selling without them, unless fixed costs are considerably 
higher when warranties are made. The condition that fixed costs 
are small rules this possibility out. The model therefore shows that 
warranties will be more common when they cost relatively little to 
make and are strongly preferred by consumers, even though con- 
siderable imperfect information exists. 
The three possible outcomes just discussed can be characterized 
mathematically. In addition to the notation used above, let "cay" 
be the comparative advantage of selling with warranties, and "aN" 
be the comparative advantage of selling without warranties. Then 
aw 
= (F + F')/(hw - cw) 
and 
aN = F/(hN 
- 
c). 
Given these definitions, 
(1) The necessary and sufficient condition for all firms to sell 
with warranties at competitive prices is 
alsw < min {aw, atN. 
(2) The necessary and sufficient condition for all firms to sell 
with warranties, but with some or all firms charging 
supracompetitive prices, is 
aw < min talsw, a N. 
(3) The necessary and sufficient condition for some (possibly 
all) firms to sell without warranties and at supracompetitive 
prices is 
caN < min taw, alsw} 
All firms will sell without warranties in this case if 
(a) axsw > (al + 2a2)aN, and 
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(b) kw < a,F'/(a, + 2a,)aN, where k w = (hw - cw) - 
(hN - c). 
Respecting the last two conditions in case (3), the first implies that 
a complete deterioration of warranty content is unlikely if a fair 
number of consumers shop, for then a,sw will be small relative to 
(a, + 2a,)aN; the inequality is then less likely to be satisfied. The 
second condition implies that a complete deterioration of warranty 
content is unlikely if consumers strongly prefer warranties, for 
then hw - cw should be considerably larger than hN - c. In this 
event, kw also will be large, and so the second inequality is less 
likely to be satisfied. 
b. No Consumers Prefer Warranties 
A warranty is an insurance policy that sellers offer against prod- 
uct-related losses. In the case considered here, consumers prefer to 
spend relatively less on insurance. For convenience, we analyze the 
effect of a consumer preference for no warranty protection; the 
analysis can be generalized to situations where consumers want 
"limited" warranties though firms are prepared to offer "full" war- 
ranties.46 Our central result is the same in either case: firms will 
never offer more warranty protection than consumers desire. 
We retain the assumptions of the previous section respecting 
consumers and firms,47 but change the notation slightly. Here "lw" 
is the consumer's willingness to pay or limit price for the product 
with a warranty while "'N" is the consumer's willingness to pay for 
the product without a warranty. The lack of a preference for war- 
ranties can be captured by the expression w - l < p* - pN: a 
consumer's marginal willingness to pay for warranty protection is 
less than the minimum premium firms must charge to sell with 
warranties. Also, the comparative advantage to firms of selling 
with warranties is then "fw," where w = (F + F')/(lw - cw); the 
comparative advantage to firms of selling without warranties is 
then "N"' where N = F/(1N - c). 
46 Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. ?? 2303-2304 (1982), a firm makes a full 
warranty if it agrees to remedy defective products at no charge "within a reasonable time," 
agrees not to limit the duration of implied warranties, and agrees to replace any defective 
products it cannot fix. Id. ? 2304(a)(1)-(4). Lesser warranties must be labeled "limited." Id. 
? 2303(a)(2). 
47 See supra text accompanying notes 43-44. 
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If enough consumers comparison shop, all firms will sell without 
warranties at the competitive price. The logic is similar to that 
used in the previous section. If all firms sell without warranties at 
the competitive price, a firm wishing to deviate will sell only to 
nonshoppers. Should it deviate in the price dimension only, it will 
charge IN; should it deviate in both price and warranty dimensions, 
it will make a warranty and charge Iw. Once more, if enough shop- 
pers exist, the losses incurred by losing their business will outweigh 
the gains from either deviation strategy. Hence, a competitive 
equilibrium in which no firms offer warranties is sustainable. The 
necessary and sufficient conditions for this equilibrium to obtain 
are 
(1) a, < N/S 
and 
(2) a, _< w/Sw. 
If too few shoppers exist to sustain a competitive equilibrium, 
firms will deviate from the competitive outcome only in the price 
dimension; they will never offer unwanted warranties. A con- 
sumer's willingness to pay for warranty protection is the difference 
between the highest price that the consumer would pay for the 
product with a warranty and the highest price he or she would pay 
for the product without one. If this difference is less than the mar- 
ginal cost to firms of offering warranties, no warranty will ever be 
offered. This is because a firm could induce a consumer to take a 
warranty only by offering it at less than marginal cost, and profit- 
maximizing firms will not make such sales. 
A consumer's willingness to pay for warranty protection may be 
written as Iw - IN and the additional marginal cost necessary to 
sell with a warranty is cw - c. Hence, no warranties are offered 
when lw - lN < cw - c. This condition does not necessarily hold 
under the relatively restrictive assumption we make that firms 
have constant marginal costs and thus sell up to a capacity con- 
straint in competitive equilibrium. This assumption is made for 
analytical tractability; were we to relax it, such that firms had 
more "normal" cost curves, it would turn out that cw = p* and c 
=- p: price equals marginal cost. Then, under this natural condi- 
tion, that lw - IN < P - P would imply that l - IN < c - c. 
Hence, we assume this latter inequality to hold. When it does, con- 
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sumers who dislike warranties would never be willing to pay for 
warranty protection; thus, no warranties would ever be observed. 
If an insufficient number of shoppers exist to sustain a com- 
petitive equilibrium, firms will increase prices. This occurs when 
al > fN/s.8 
C. Preliminary Normative Implications 
Firms are commonly said to respond to the existence of "imper- 
fect information" by supplying less warranty coverage than con- 
sumers want.49 The forgoing model shows, in contrast, that when 
consumers prefer warranties, markets frequently will supply just 
the warranty coverage they desire. It further shows that not every 
consumer must shop for warranties to make warranty markets re- 
sponsive to consumer preferences. These results are significant for 
three reasons. First, assuming that consumers can make correct 
choices-they know failure probabilities perfectly-the competi- 
tive equilibria that actually occur are efficient. Second, noncom- 
petitive equilibria take a different form than is commonly sup- 
posed. Firms are thought to reduce warranty coverage in these 
situations,50 but they are more likely to offer the correct coverage 
at supracompetitive prices. This has obvious policy implications 
that we pursue below.51 Third, consumers in our model will 
purchase warranties only if they believe warranty protection to be 
worthwhile; that is, only if warranties are offered for sale at or be- 
low the consumers' limit prices. Persons in general seem better off 
if they can get what they want-though they sometimes may have 
to pay too much for it-than if their desires are frustrated 
altogether. 
48 The text describes models of warranty markets in two special cases-when all consum- 
ers prefer warranties and when none do. It does not describe the intermediate case in which 
some consumers prefer warranties but others do not. This case is less important normatively 
than the models set out above, is tedious to analyze, and is unlikely to yield different re- 
sults. The two polar cases imply outcomes that run in the same direction-firms in both 
cases commonly respond to insufficient shopping with higher prices rather than lowered 
contract quality. An intermediate case is unlikely to generate outcomes that run in a differ- 
ent direction. In a related model, we characterized necessary and sufficient conditions for 
competitive equilibria to obtain in markets for goods of different qualities when consumers 
have heterogeneous quality preferences. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 41. This model 
yielded results that are consistent with those described above. 
49 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
O See, e.g., id. 
01 See infra text accompanying notes 116-21. 
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Finally, the model is suggestive respecting the question whether 
imperfect information causes a warranty market to behave 
noncompetitively. Economic models often are hard to apply di- 
rectly to real world problems because it is difficult to gather the 
data on which their application depends. For example, explicit 
warranty prices seldom are observable because firms commonly sell 
a joint product for a single price-the item with a warranty. Also, 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the various equilibria 
include terms referring to firms' marginal costs (cw and c); margi- 
nal cost data is notoriously hard to get. Hence, a model such as 
ours is useful for policy purposes only if it tells a story that is more 
plausible than competing but equally difficult to test explanations. 
The model also may assist in the evaluation of actual market out- 
comes if, in addition, it suggests factors that correlate with norma- 
tively relevant states of the world and if decisionmakers can ob- 
serve such factors relatively conveniently. Our model satisfies all of 
these criteria fairly well. 
The model rests on the plausible intuition that firms will satisfy 
consumer preferences when doing so would increase profits. If 
enough consumers will withdraw business from firms that ignore 
their interests, satisfying those interests then becomes the profit- 
maximizing strategy. Normatively desirable equilibria in our 
model-those in which consumer preferences for warranty terms 
are satisfied-therefore correlate positively with the extent of com- 
parison shopping in which consumers engage. The model also rests 
on the intuition that consumers will get what they want if they are 
willing to pay for it. In particular, if consumers strongly prefer 
warranties, firms are unlikely to have a comparative advantage at 
selling without warranties; consequently, the probable response of 
firms to imperfect information will be to raise prices rather than 
dilute warranty content. Thus, normatively desirable equilibria in 
our model also correlate positively with consumers' willingness to 
pay. The factors of comparison shopping and willingness to pay 
generate a story about warranty markets that seems more plausible 
than the signalling and comparative advantage explanations.62 
These two factors may also be of use to decisionmakers in evaluat- 
ing actual markets. 
62 See supra text accompanying notes 21-34. 
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To understand how these factors might be used, it is helpful to 
look first at typical consumer warranties. Perhaps the most impor- 
tant fact about such warranties is their homogeneity. Almost iden- 
tical warranty coverage often exists within and even across product 
lines. "Hard" goods, for instance, are often sold under a standard 
warranty that (1) disclaims implied warranties of merchantability 
and fitness, (2) expressly warrants against defects in materials and 
workmanship, (3) limits buyers' recovery under this warranty to 
repair or replacement of defective product parts, (4) limits the 
time within which warranty claims can be brought, and (5) when 
personal injury or serious property damage is possible, excludes re- 
covery for consequential damages.53 Deviations from this pattern, 
broadly speaking, are of two major types. Some firms will reduce 
coverage, either by limiting recovery to the original purchaser or 
excluding it for specified uses, such as racing a passenger vehicle. 
Other firms may expand coverage, primarily by lengthening the 
standard term within which claims can be brought. Because of the 
very small sample sizes in existing research of actual warranties 
and because researchers often compare warranties across industries 
rather than within particular product lines, it is impossible to 
know how frequently these deviations from the standard warranty 
actually occur. Accordingly, we consider three hypothetical cases in 
light of our warranty model. 
1. All Firms Selling a Similar Product Line Offer the Same 
Warranty Which Provides Less Than Full Protection Against 
Product-Related Harms 
Our model shows that consumers will get no more coverage than 
they want but may get less. Thus, identical warranties offering less 
than full protection could reflect either firms satisfying consumer 
preferences or diluting warranty coverage in identical fashion. 
Decisionmakers could use the factors of comparison shopping and 
consumer willingness to pay to determine which interpretation is 
83 This pattern used to describe both consumer and commercial warranties, but consumer 
warranties have been modified by the Magnuson-Moss Act, which prohibits disclaimers of 
implied warranties if firms make express warranties, and by the strict liability doctrine, 
which requires firms to bear the risk of consumers' personal injuries. See also U.C.C. ? 2- 
719(3) (1978). Warranty patterns are described in A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 14, at 
189-94; Priest, supra note 21, at 1307-13. 
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more likely to be correct. The following example illustrates how 
such an analysis might work. 
When consumers prefer a given level of warranty protection, all 
firms in a market will offer less protection if and only if each of 
three conditions is satisfied: 
(1) aN < min Iarw, a,Sw}; 
(2) a,sw > (al + 2a,)aN; 
(3) kw < a,F'/(a. + 2a,)aN, where kw = (h - cw) 
(hN - c). 
Let 
F = $1,000 
F' = $200 (for a fuller warranty) 
s = 100 units 
c = $45 
c - $46 (for a fuller warranty)" 
hw= $62 (for a fuller warranty) 
hN = $59 
a, = .80 (80% of the consumers are nonshoppers). 
The first of the three conditions is satisfied because aN = 71, aw 
75, a,sw = 80, and thus, aN < min [aw, alswJ. Because firms 
have a comparative advantage at selling without warranties, some 
of them could limit coverage in response to a lack of comparison 
shopping. The second of the three conditions is not satisfied, how- 
ever. Because asw -= 80 and (a1 + 2a,)aN = 85, the left side of the 
inequality is less than the right side. Thus, the identical coverage 
could not stem from frustration of consumer preferences. More- 
over, because too little comparison shopping would lead some firms 
to reduce coverage, that no firms in this illustration have done so 
implies that comparison shopping is actually sufficient to sustain a 
competitive equilibrium."" 
We have defined a consumer's willingness to pay for warranty 
coverage as the difference between the highest prices the consumer 
" This illustration supposes r to be .01. Then, if c = $45, cw = $46 because cw = 
c/(1 - 7). 
" Because firms will offer less protection if and only if all three conditions are met, we 
need not examine the third condition, the second not being met. 
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would pay for the good with and without that coverage. In our il- 
lustration, this difference is $3. Let the willingness to pay for a 
warranty rise to $4.50. Then the comparative advantages are re- 
versed; aN remains at 71 while aw declines to 68. Now firms will 
find it more profitable to sell with warranties than without; ac- 
cordingly, they will not respond to imperfect information by reduc- 
ing coverage. Thus, although the figures themselves are imaginary, 
they do suggest that if a moderate amount of comparison shopping 
occurs (twenty percent in the example) and if consumers strongly 
prefer warranties, an outcome in which all firms offer the same 
warranty is unlikely to reflect a complete frustration of consumer 
preferences.56 
2. Most Firms in a Market Offer the Same Warranty, but a Few 
Offer Greater Coverage on Important Components 
Because consumers again will not get more warranty coverage 
than they want, this pattern reflects one of three things. First, it 
may reflect "noise": the deviating firms may be making promo- 
tional warranties or experimenting to find actual consumer prefer- 
ences. Second, previously unnoticed differences in products or con- 
sumer preferences may account for differences in warranty 
protection.57 Third, a lack of comparison shopping could be caus- 
ing most firms to reduce warranty coverage. 
These possibilities suggest what factors a decisionmaker should 
explore. Promotional warranties are easy to identify because they 
are commonly associated with the introduction of new products. As 
for the other two possibilities, the question is whether consumers 
comparison shop for the products that have and those that lack 
the better warranty. Suppose that consumers who purchase the 
6 Searching for terms is probably more costly than searching for prices-and thus less 
term searching may occur-because it presumably takes more time to absorb and compare 
information about terms than about prices. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 5, at 660. 
Accordingly, a consumer may discover the price and warranty by a store visit, but not learn 
about some other terms. As to these terms, firms may reduce contract quality. See supra 
note 1 and accompanying text; infra note 106. 
67 A decisionmaker evaluating coverage must make an initial, largely impressionistic judg- 
ment as to what products are in the same market. The Renault Alliance, for example, is 
unlikely to compete with the Mercedes 300SD. Diverse warranty coverage thus may indicate 
previously unnoticed differences in product types or consumer wants. The existence and 
relevance of product and consumer heterogeneity are discussed in more detail infra pp. 
1446-50. 
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warranty most firms use would not purchase the better one, even if 
available, because they believe the additional protection is not 
worth its cost to them. Two markets would then exist, one for a 
product with the standard warranty and the other for a product 
with the more extensive warranty; coverage in each market would 
be homogeneous and can be evaluated as in the first illustration."5 
But if consumers would pay the premium required for greater war- 
ranty protection so that only one market in fact exists, market per- 
formance would be unsatisfactory. Many firms would then be of- 
fering less preferred coverage at supracompetitive prices. 
3. Most Firms in a Market Offer the Same Warranty, but a Few 
Restrict Coverage 
As with the last example, this pattern could reflect unsuspected 
variety in consumer preferences: consumers who purchase the re- 
stricted warranty might be unwilling to pay the premium required 
to obtain the usual warranty. Alternatively, one market exists and 
a few firms in it are reducing warranty protection. In this event, 
prices for the standard warranty will likely be too high, for insuffi- 
cient comparison shopping occurs to sustain the competitive equi- 
librium. If investigation rules out heterogeneity in consumer pref- 
erences, a decisionmaker would know that although warranty 
protection is not a serious problem-only a few firms reduce cover- 
age-pricing should be. An analysis of actual pricing patterns 
would then establish the nature and seriousness of any supracom- 
petitive pricing that exists. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Two general remarks should be made about using our model to 
analyze warranty markets. First, the factors that we suggest sel- 
dom can be precisely applied. They rely heavily on survey data, 
such as inquiries into how much shopping occurs and whether con- 
sumers would pay for broader warranty protection. Such data is 
expensive to gather and will sometimes suffer from response bias: a 
consumer might, for example, tell an interviewer that he would pay 
a large sum for warranty coverage because he wants to portray 
himself as a prudent person, while in fact he would buy without a 
58 See supra pp. 1416-18. 
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warranty if given the choice. Nevertheless, consumer surveys may 
yield useful data and are employed in other legal fields for pur- 
poses similar to those suggested here. In ruling on the competitive 
effects of mergers, for example, consumer attitudes toward possible 
price movements are used to determine whether products trade in 
the same market."6 Moreover, decisionmakers now evaluate the ef- 
fect of imperfect information on warranty terms without reference 
to either theory or data. Suggestive data, the relevance of which is 
implied by plausible theory, should yield more sensible policy. 
Second, both the relatively happy normative outcomes that the 
model predicts-that consumers will often get the warranties they 
want and that competitive equilibria are efficient-and the posi- 
tive analysis itself depend heavily on the model's assumptions. For 
example, if consumers choose warranties incorrectly because they 
lack information about risks, market responsiveness to consumer 
choices may not be especially desirable. The model's assumptions 
thus require more detailed analysis. After setting out our model of 
a security interest market, then, we consider the effect of relaxing 
some of the important assumptions on which both models rest. 
III. SECURITY INTEREST MARKETS 
Security interests in consumer goods have been extensively regu- 
lated.60 Because the central concern of this regulation has been the 
use of seemingly overbroad security terms,61 the question is 
whether firms exploit imperfect information by exacting more dra- 
59 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 6e The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.), which has been adopted in 10 states, 
generally limits the security interest which a seller may take in consumer goods to the goods 
themselves. U.C.C.C. ?? 2.407 - .409 (1969) (adopted with modifications in Colorado, Idaho, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming). A number 
of states which have not adopted the U.C.C.C. have enacted similar restrictions. See, e.g., 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255D, ?? 15, 18 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law ?? 410, 
421 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982); N.C. Gen. Stat. ?? 25A-23, 25A-27 (Supp. 1981); Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. ? 1317.071 (Page 1979); W. Va. Code ?? 46A-2-107 to -109 (1980). 
8l One of the few exceptions to the general rule that the seller can take a security interest 
only in the goods themselves arises when the buyer purchases more than one item on credit 
from the seller. In this circumstance, most states allow the seller to take an interest in the 
previously purchased goods to secure payment of the later purchased goods. Legislatures, 
however, typically protect against these seemingly overbroad security terms by requiring the 
seller to apply all payments to the earliest purchased item and to release its security interest 
in that item as soon as it is paid in full. See, e.g., U.C.C.C. ? 2.409 (1969); state statutes 
cited supra note 60. 
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conian security interests than well-informed consumers would 
grant. As before, we first assume that consumers can choose secur- 
ity interests correctly and then set forth a model of a security in- 
terest market in which consumers are imperfectly informed of mar- 
ket prices and terms.62 This model shows that firms will not 
respond to insufficient consumer search by exacting overbroad se- 
curity interests, but may charge supracompetitive interest rates for 
those security terms that consumers prefer. Hence, regulation re- 
stricting security on imperfect information grounds is miscon- 
ceived if consumer choices for and against security are correct, a 
question we take up in Part IV. 
Our model initially rests on seven assumptions about firms. (1) 
Creditors are banks, all of which lend a fixed amount "L." (2) The 
likelihood of consumer default is "ir," which is known to both firms 
and consumers. (3) Consumers who default may go bankrupt; the 
probability that a consumer will go bankrupt given that he or she 
has defaulted is "X." (4) Firms recover a fraction of the unpaid 
debt, "p," in bankruptcy proceedings. (5) A firm can lend with or 
without a security interest, but cannot do both. Security interests 
in this model are purchase money; the bank provides credit to en- 
able the consumer to buy the product.63 If a firm takes security, it 
can recover the value of the used good, "V," whether the consumer 
goes bankrupt or not.64 We assume that the collateral on reposses- 
sion is worth less than the outstanding debt (L > V). (6) The in- 
terest rate is "r"; "S" represents the total amount of funds availa- 
ble for loans and S/L = s is the firm's capacity, the total number 
of loans that can be made. (7) "F" is the firm's fixed cost in mak- 
ing loans, and "c" is its marginal cost. This marginal cost is mea- 
62 A technical version of this model is attached as Appendix 2. Several explanations of 
why security is given exist. For example, security is said to reduce net lending costs or signal 
the creditworthiness of debtors. These explanations are unpersuasive. See Schwartz, Secur- 
ity Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. Legal Stud. 1 
(1981). We are not concerned here with why security is used, but only with whether imper- 
fect information will cause it to be used in ways that frustrate consumer preferences. 
63 This assumption is made for convenience. The model's qualitative results are un- 
changed if other common forms of security are assumed. 
64 Firms have more difficulty recovering consumer goods in bankruptcy than this assump- 
tion suggests partly because bankruptcy courts can stay the enforcement of security inter- 
ests and also because consumers in some cases can keep the collateral if they make specified 
payments on it. See Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. ?? 362, 522(f), 1322, 1325 (1982). This diffi- 
culty in foreclosing can be captured by substituting for V an expected value for the collat- 
eral, E(V), where E(V) < V. The analysis then proceeds unaffected. 
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sured as an interest rate-the opportunity cost of forgoing loans in 
commercial markets. Let "cs" be the marginal cost of lending with 
security and "cN" the marginal cost of lending unsecured. If a firm 
does take security, its fixed costs increase by an amount "F": F' 
includes the cost of drafting security agreements, administering a 
resale facility for repossessed collateral, and so forth. 
Based on these assumptions, a firm's expected marginal rate of 
loss from consumer bankruptcy is wrX(1 - p) -= k.6 If the firm 
takes a security interest, it can recover the value of the used good, 
V. Because it otherwise might have to seek this value in bank- 
ruptcy, and its rate of loss on the sum would then be k, the value 
of security to the firm is Vk; a security interest saves the firm this 
amount. The additional cost per loan of taking a security interest 
is F'/s, where F' is the increased cost of security and s is the num- 
ber of loans. We assume F'/s < Vk; in other words, the cost of 
security to a firm (F'/s) is less than the gain (Vk). If rN is the com- 
petitive interest rate on a loan without security and rs is the rate 
with security, it then follows that r* > rs. interest rates fall when 
firms take security because, in competitive equilibrium, price 
equals cost and security lowers a firm's costs. 
Respecting consumers, we make four additional assumptions. (1) 
Each consumer wants to borrow L dollars or none. (2) Consumers 
shop exactly as they do for warranties. In particular, consumers set 
fixed sample sizes before searching for loans, with some sample 
sizes equaling one (the nonshoppers) and some sample sizes ex- 
ceeding one (the shoppers). (3) Consumers again have two limit 
prices (or interest rates), one for an unsecured loan (hN) and one 
for a secured loan (hs). Because consumers will pay higher interest 
rates when no security interest attaches, hN > hs. (4) Consumers 
prefer not to give security. A consumer offered the choice between 
borrowing at competitive interest rates with or without giving se- 
curity will pay the premium necessary to compensate firms for 
lending unsecured.66 
This model implies that, if enough comparison shopping occurs, 
85 If a firm recovers a fraction of the unpaid debt, p, in bankruptcy proceedings, it loses 
the fraction (1 - p) when the consumer goes bankrupt. The probability of default is Tr, and 
the probability of bankruptcy given default is X. Thus, the total expected rate of loss from 
bankruptcy is the product of these factors, rX(1 - p), which we denote by k. 
66 For convenience, consumers are said to prefer no security at all; the analysis also ap- 
plies when consumers prefer less security than firms would like to obtain. 
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the only single price equilibrium is at the competitive price with- 
out security (rn). The logic underlying this result is similar to that 
used in the warranty model.67 Let all firms lend at the competitive 
rate without security. A firm wishing to raise its price above rN but 
lend unsecured will lose the business of every shopper. Shoppers 
will see other firms lending unsecured at r*. The deviating firm 
will therefore lend only to nonshoppers and will charge them hN, 
the highest rate for a loan without security that consumers will 
pay. If too few nonshoppers exist, the firm would be better off 
charging r* than raising its interest rate to the limit. Similarly, any 
firm that demands a security interest will also lend only to non- 
shoppers. The shoppers, we have assumed, prefer borrowing un- 
secured at r* to borrowing secured at the lowest price possible for 
secured loans, rs. Thus, a firm that demands a security interest will 
sell only to nonshoppers and will raise its price to hs, the highest 
interest rate consumers are willing to pay for secured loans. Once 
more, if too few nonshoppers exist, this strategy will be less profit- 
able than continuing to lend unsecured at rN. 
If too few shoppers exist to sustain a competitive equilibrium, 
firms will charge supracompetitive interest rates but would not de- 
mand security. Recall that a firm's marginal cost for lending with 
and without security is cs and cN, respectively. Firms will not forgo 
security unless consumers are willing to pay them the cost of giving 
it up. This cost is cN - cs; the consumers' willingness to pay to 
avoid security is hN - hs. Hence, firms will not demand security if 
hN 
- h > cN - cs. Again, though this inequality does not necessa- 
rily hold given the restrictive constant marginal cost assumption 
we make, we assume it to hold for it would be the case that cN r 
and cs = rs were firms supposed to have more normal cost curves. 
Therefore, if consumers do not prefer security at competitive rates, 
but too few of them shop to generate a competitive equilibrium, 
firms will charge supracompetitive interest rates, but will not exact 
unwanted security interests. 
Consumers may prefer to grant security if the cost savings to 
firms from having security (Vk) is large. In this event, consumers' 
willingness to pay to avoid security may be less than the premium 
firms would charge to lend unsecured (hN - hs < r rs); con- 
sumers will want the interest rate reductions that security makes 
e7 See supra p. 1409. 
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possible. The analysis is then similar to that of the warranty 
model. If enough consumers comparison shop, all firms will lend 
with security at r*. If too little shopping occurs to sustain a com- 
petitive equilibrium and firms have a comparative advantage at 
selling with security, all firms will demand security but some or all 
will charge supracompetitive prices. Finally, if insufficient shop- 
ping occurs and the comparative advantage is the other way, firms 
will both charge supracompetitive prices and lend without security. 
Firms will have a comparative advantage at lending with security if 
the fixed cost of security (F') is low and the consumers' desire 
(hN - hs) for the lower interest rate that accompanies it is high. 
Hence, consumers who prefer to borrow with security will be able 
to do so if their preference is sufficiently strong and security is not 
excessively costly for firms to take, even if little shopping for credit 
terms occurs. 
This analysis implies that current regulation of security interests 
in consumer goods may be misconceived to the extent that it is 
made to rest on the notion that consumers are imperfectly in- 
formed about the possibilities respecting security that the market 
offers. Current regulation aims almost exclusively to restrict the 
ability of firms to demand security. But firms will not demand 
more security than consumers wish to give (although they may ex- 
act less because taking security involves some cost to the firm). 
Also, the competitive equilibria that exist in markets for security 
interests are efficient, assuming consumers can make correct 
choices concerning security. Thus, the principal problem that can 
occur in markets for security is that interest rates may be at 
supracompetitive levels. This problem, however, has already been 
addressed with some success by legislation such as the Truth in 
Lending Act.68 Again, though, the positive and normative implica- 
tions of this analysis are sensitive to its assumptions. For example, 
we suppose that consumers can make correct choices respecting se- 
curity but have given no grounds in support of this assumption. 
We thus turn to an analysis of the important but seemingly contro- 
versial assumptions that underlie our models. 
" 15 U.S.C. ?? 1601-1667e (1982). See also Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 5, at 656-58. 
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IV. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS 
Economic models commonly make assumptions for heuristic 
purposes that may be false in fact. Although these assumptions 
often are innocuous,69 they may, at times, vitally affect the impli- 
cations of an economic model. Three of the assumptions on which 
the warranty and security interest models rest may seem particu- 
larly problematic: (1) consumers can value the risks contract terms 
allocate-they know the "odds"; (2) consumers cannot affect the 
odds; this assumption, among other things, allows us conveniently 
to suppose that consumer preferences for warranty and security in- 
terest terms are homogeneous; (3) all consumers read the contract. 
Although the results of these models must be qualified in light of a 
more realistic appraisal of these assumptions, the qualifications do 
not seem especially serious. 
A. Imperfect Information in the First Sense: Knowing the 
Odds 
The typical person's estimate of the odds of product failure or of 
his or her own default will seldom equal the true probabilities. 
Firms are commonly supposed to exploit these errors by imposing 
unwanted contract terms. Firms, however, respond to consumers as 
an aggregate, not as individuals; consequently, no firm knows or 
could know any particular consumer's estimate of the odds.70 Thus, 
the question is whether consumers in the aggregate systematically 
6" For example, our models assume that consumers have peculiar demand func- 
tions-they always buy one unit or none. The models also assume that firms have peculiar 
cost structures-they have constant marginal costs so that average costs decline steadily 
until the level of output is reached at which costs are minimized, after which they become 
infinite. The implications of the models do not change when these strong assumptions are 
relaxed. See Sadanand & Wilde, supra note 39. The models further assume that consumers 
have common limit prices and use fixed sample size search strategies. The former assump- 
tion is false and the latter is only a plausible surmise, yet the predictions of our homogene- 
ous goods model, which used these assumptions, are consistent with actual market behavior. 
See authorities cited supra note 40. 
70 The text assumes that firms cannot learn enough about consumers in typical transac- 
tions to offer each consumer a different contract based on that consumer's sophistication. 
The pervasiveness of standard form contracts is consistent with this premise. See Leff, Con- 
tract As Thing, 19 Am. U.L. Rev. 131 (1970). This article adopts the standard assumption 
that consumers hold beliefs about the odds and that these beliefs influence purchase 
choices: consumers who think products are reliable will care less about warranties than will 
consumers who think products are likely to fail, other things being equal. 
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err such that firms have incentives to degrade contract content. 
We next argue that error of this sort is uncommon. 
1. Market Responses to Consumer Error 
We shall begin with consumer beliefs about product reliability. A 
consumer's subjective estimate of the odds of product failure is re- 
lated to but is not wholly determined by actual failure probabili- 
ties for two reasons. First, a consumer's subjective belief about the 
odds probably bears some relation to the actual odds. A new car 
model, for example, is unlikely to be very much more or less relia- 
ble than prior models. A consumer often will have owned an earlier 
model or something similar to it or have talked with friends who 
have owned one or who own the new model. Moreover, magazines 
and newspapers often discuss the characteristics of many new 
models. Hence, the actual odds should affect individual consumers' 
estimates of what those odds are. Second, because consumers lack 
the expertise and resources to test products and because some 
product characteristics are only revealed through use, a consumer's 
estimate of the actual odds will seldom be completely accurate. 
That the facts and personal perceptions of those facts affect the 
way consumers estimate risks can be represented mathematically. 
Let "S" represent a consumer's subjective belief of the likelihood 
of product failure, "A" the actual odds, and "e" an error term re- 
flecting the existence of imperfect information. Then E(S) = E(A) 
+ E(e), where "E" denotes the expected odds and errors are as- 
sumed to be additive. If a consumer is optimistic, thinking the 
product more reliable than it is, e is on average negative, so that 
E(S) < E(A). If the consumer is pessimistic, believing the product 
to be less reliable than it actually is, e is on average positive, so 
that E(S) > E(A). For the unbiased consumer, e is zero: E(S) 
E(A). 
a. Consumer Error Is Random 
Suppose that consumers in the aggregate hold subjective beliefs 
(S) that fluctuate randomly around the true value (A) such that 
consumer error (e) is "unbiased." An error term is unbiased when 
positive and negative estimates of the true value cancel out; hence, 
for consumers in the aggregate the mean estimate E(S) will equal 
the true value E(A). Because consumers in our model shop ran- 
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domly, each firm will probably see a representative sample of the 
market. In this event, firms will respond as if the consumers visit- 
ing them knew the odds perfectly. Thus, if consumer estimates of 
the odds of product defects, or of any other odds, fluctuate ran- 
domly around true values, imperfect information about the risks 
being allocated may exist but will not cause policy problems. 
b. Consumers in the Aggregate Are Pessimistic 
Markets also commonly correct for consumer pessimism. To see 
how, we shall consider the two ways in which pessimism is mani- 
fested. First, consumers would prefer a warranty at competitive 
prices if they knew the actual odds but are pessimistic about the 
possibility of product failure. In this instance, pessimism is re- 
flected in the limit price for the product without a warranty, hN, 
which declines; pessimistic consumers have a lower demand for 
products sold without warranty protection. Pessimism of this sort 
will not cause firms to reduce contract protection. Indeed, dis- 
claimers are less likely than if consumers knew the actual odds of 
product failure. When hw increases relative to hN, firms will more 
likely have a comparative advantage at selling with warranties. 
The pessimism of consumers who would want warranties were they 
perfectly informed therefore reduces the likelihood that firms will 
reduce warranty coverage in response to a lack of comparison 
shopping. 
Suppose now that consumers would, if perfectly informed, prefer 
no warranty protection, but pessimism respecting the odds of 
product breakdown causes consumers to want a warranty. Compar- 
ison shopping can ensure that consumers pay competitive prices 
for warranty coverage, but consumers would be purchasing more 
coverage than they really want. This problem does not seem seri- 
ous for two reasons. First, substantial consumer pessimism may be 
short-lived because firms have an incentive to dissipate it. Pessi- 
mistic consumers not only prefer unnecessary warranties when 
they buy, but also buy fewer products than they would were they 
well informed. Hence, firms should make efforts to prevent or re- 
duce systematic pessimism. Second, pessimism at worst causes 
consumers to be overinsured. Consumers seemingly are worse off if 
they are without protection against product-related losses than if 
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they sometimes have too much protection.71 
Consumer choices of security terms can be analyzed similarly. If 
consumers err randomly in their estimate of the odds of default, 
firms will respond as if consumers knew the actual odds. Respect- 
ing pessimism, suppose first that consumers would reject security 
interests if well informed and that consumers believe default more 
likely than it is in fact. These consumers will be willing to pay 
more than they should to avoid security interests. Comparison 
shopping, however, can prevent firms from exploiting this greater 
willingness to pay by charging excessive interest rates. Suppose 
next that well-informed consumers would prefer security but pessi- 
mism respecting the odds of default causes actual consumers to re- 
ject it. Then, although comparison shopping would cause interest 
rates for unsecured loans to be competitive, consumers would be 
borrowing under the wrong contract. This problem does not seem 
serious for the same reasons that the identical warranty problem 
does not appear bothersome. Firms have an incentive to dissipate 
pessimism because not only will pessimistic consumers reject se- 
7 The model has assumed that all consumers in a market hold similar views respecting 
the odds, but the shoppers may hold different views. The results of the model are not af- 
fected when this possibility is admitted because shoppers will probably be more pessimistic 
than nonshoppers when the two groups differ. To understand the effect of this relative pes- 
simism, consider three cases. Suppose first that all consumers would prefer warranties if 
they were properly informed, that nonshoppers hold unbiased or pessimistic views respect- 
ing the odds, and that shoppers are pessimistic. Because firms respond to pessimistic shop- 
pers as if they make correct choices, when the nonshoppers hold unbiased or pessimistic 
views the relatively greater pessimism of the shoppers is irrelevant. In both cases, firms will 
act as if all consumers make correct choices. 
Now suppose that all consumers would prefer warranties if they were properly informed, 
that nonshoppers are optimists, and that shoppers are pessimists. If all consumers are opti- 
mists, a policy problem exists, but the optimism of the nonshoppers may be moderated by 
the relatively greater pessimism of the shoppers. For example, firms may offer warranties in 
response to the shoppers' pessimism. 
Finally, suppose that no consumers would prefer warranties if properly informed, that 
nonshoppers hold correct or optimistic estimates in the aggregate, and that shoppers are 
pessimistic. Firms may respond to the shoppers by offering unwanted warranties, but the 
text argues that this is not a serious problem. Hence, if shoppers and nonshoppers hold 
different views respecting the odds, but the shoppers are relatively more pessimistic than 
the nonshoppers, the analysis is unaffected. 
The shoppers probably will be at least as pessimistic as the nonshoppers because, as we 
later show, search is partly motivated by the perception that purchases are risky. Consumers 
search for information about products in part to reduce the psychological discomfort they 
would otherwise experience by bearing risks. See infra text accompanying notes 75-76. Be- 
cause pessimists are likely to experience this discomfort while optimists are not, shoppers as 
a class will be more pessimistic, if anything, than nonshoppers. 
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curity, but they will also be less anxious to incur debt. Moreover, 
the perceived policy problem in this area is that security interests 
place consumers at the mercy of firms; pessimism at worst causes 
consumers to be less at the mercy of firms than they would be if 
fully informed. 
c. Consumers in the Aggregate Are Optimistic 
Markets may correct poorly for consumer optimism. Suppose 
that consumers would want warranty protection if they knew the 
odds of product failure, but actual consumers are optimistic about 
these odds. In this case, optimism is reflected in the consumer's 
limit price, hN, which is higher than it would be were the true odds 
known: optimistic consumers have an artificially high willingness 
to pay for goods without warranties. If comparison shopping is in- 
sufficient to sustain a competitive equilibrium, firms are more 
likely to reduce warranty coverage than if consumers were fully in- 
formed. This is because when hw falls relative to hN-the limit 
price for the product without a warranty-firms will more likely 
have a comparative advantage at selling without warranties. 
Hence, when well-informed consumers would want warranties and 
actual consumers are optimistic, insufficient comparison shopping 
is likely to yield both supracompetitive prices and suboptimal cov- 
erage. This problem can be cured, at least in theory, by facilitating 
comparison shopping, but optimism causes a second problem that 
is less easily treated. 
If well-informed consumers would want warranties but optimism 
causes these consumers not to demand them, warranties will prob- 
ably not appear. Firms lack an incentive to offer broader warran- 
ties than consumers demand because warranties are costly: firms 
must redeem their warranty guarantees. Optimistic consumers 
might resist the price increases necessary to cover this cost. On the 
other hand, optimistic consumers who purchase too narrow war- 
ranties will often be disappointed; they will experience significant 
uninsured losses. Firms consequently will lose goodwill. Hence, 
firms seemingly are better off if consumers would make correct 
choices, for then firms can preserve good will by making appropri- 
ate warranties, yet recover the full costs that these warranties cre- 
ate. Curing consumer optimism, however, could be difficult. Firms 
would be reluctant to conduct an advertising campaign the theme 
of which is "Our widgets break a lot." A more promising response 
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is to make correct warranties but bury the cost in the total price of 
the product. How often this is done is not known. Also, some firms 
might maximize profits by exploiting consumer optimism in the 
short run. Thus, systematic consumer optimism respecting product 
failure rates creates a policy problem, but its seriousness is 
unknown. 
If consumers in security interest markets believe default to be 
less likely than it is in fact, they will not resist demands for secur- 
ity interests strongly enough, for they will think foreclosure is un- 
likely. We showed above that firms will not demand security when 
consumers are willing to pay to avoid it. This occurs if hN - hs > 
cN - c. Optimistic consumers, however, may set hN too low or hs 
too high; in either event, the difference between hN and hs will be 
smaller than it should be, increasing the likelihood that this differ- 
ence will not exceed the marginal cost to firms of forgoing security 
interests. Thus, if consumers are optimistic regarding the odds of 
default, they will make too many secured loans. Moreover, lenders 
will be unlikely to correct consumers' misperceptions by stressing 
how likely a default may be because such an action will decrease 
lenders' profits from making loans. Hence, consumer optimism 
about the odds of default also seems a policy problem, albeit one of 
which the scope is unknown.72 
To summarize, aggregate consumer estimates of the odds will be 
unbiased, systematically pessimistic, or systematically optimistic. 
The first two possibilities do not create serious policy problems in- 
dependent of those caused by insufficient consumer shopping for 
favorable terms itself, but the latter might. Thus, we next ask 
whether reasons exist to believe consumers are systematically opti- 
mistic respecting the consequences of commercial choice. 
72 The goodwill loss to lenders from borrower optimism seems less significant than the 
loss to firms of selling products to optimistic consumers. First, borrowers may not fix blame 
for their financial difficulties on the lender: unlike the seller of a faulty product, creditors 
do not themselves cause the harm that their defaulting customers incur. Second, lenders 
may not want repeat business from defaulting borrowers, unlike product sellers who want 
the repeat business of even those buyers whose products break. Accordingly, consumer opti- 
mism is less likely to self-correct in markets for security interests than in markets for war- 
ranty terms. 
Imperfect Information 
2. Consumer Optimism: The Nature of the Problem 
Whether or not consumers are systematically optimistic respect- 
ing the odds that products will fail or that they themselves will 
default on loans is unknown. Also, rigorous tests of an optimism 
hypothesis seem difficult to conduct. Thus, it is necessary to ask 
whether decisionmakers should assume consumers are optimistic 
or not pending the gathering of data. 
In the case of product risks, imperfect information seems prima- 
rily a problem for infrequently purchased goods. Consumers buy 
toothpaste, milk, and razor blades often enough to know how relia- 
bly they perform. Moreover, such goods are inexpensive, and the 
risks that come with them are generally either very improbable or 
limited to the low cost of the product involved. The law justifiably 
seems more concerned with expensive mistakes than with cheap 
ones. Hence, the question is whether consumers believe that ex- 
pensive, infrequently purchased products perform better than they 
do in fact. Consumer optimism may be caused in either of two 
ways. First, markets may provide insufficient data on which relia- 
bility can be gauged, and persons may respond to uncertainty with 
optimism. Second, the data exists but persons may erroneously 
make more optimistic predictions than the data permits. 
Insufficient data is thought to exist because when consumers 
purchase infrequently, they cannot rely on their own experience. 
New washers, the argument goes, are different from ten-year-old 
washers. But consumers can search for information about new 
washers. Accordingly, insufficient data will exist only if consumers 
fail to search for it or firms fail to offer it. Neither possibility 
seems plausible. Economic analysis suggests that persons will seek 
more information about expensive products than about cheap ones 
largely because people want to avoid risk and because risk gener- 
ally increases with product price. This increased search should 
compensate for the relative lack of personal experience with the 
risks that attend expensive products. 
The analysis that generates these conclusions rests on five as- 
sumptions about the risks involved and the way consumers react to 
them. (1) Persons dislike uncertainty and will incur costs to reduce 
it. (2) Uncertainty about product reliability can be represented as 
the range of odds in consumers' estimates. Consumers might, for 
instance, be confident that the chance that a product will fail is 
between ten and thirty percent, but not know where in that range 
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the odds actually fall. (3) The "odds range" does not shrink as 
products become more expensive: expensive goods are at least as 
difficult to evaluate as cheap ones. (4) There are economies of scale 
to search. (5) Consumers believe they can reduce uncertainty by 
acquiring more information about products. 
These assumptions imply that persons will search relatively 
more for reliability data when they buy expensive items. Suppose 
that a product costs $100 and becomes useless when it breaks, a 
consumer believes the chance of a breakdown is between ten and 
thirty percent, and increased search could reduce this range to be- 
tween ten and fifteen percent. Without search, the expected value 
of a loss ranges $20, from $10 to $30. Search could reduce the 
range by $15 to between $10 and $15. Now let the product cost 
$1,000. Assumptions (1) and (5) imply that consumers will be mo- 
tivated to search in both cases to reduce the range. Assumption (3) 
asserts that the odds range does not shrink with the product's 
price; thus, the expected loss now has a range of $200 and can be 
reduced $150 by search. This relatively large reduction creates a 
substantial incentive for consumers to search. And assumption (4) 
implies that search itself is more fruitful in this second case be- 
cause the more expensive the product, the greater the return per 
search dollar in reducing uncertainty about possible losses. Hence, 
consumers should attempt to find out relatively more about prod- 
uct reliability when they buy expensive items. 
The assumptions on which these results rely seem sound. The 
notion that expensive products are generally as difficult to assess 
as cheap ones seems unexceptionable. The assumption that per- 
sons will incur costs to reduce uncertainty fits with the penchant 
of people to buy insurance, which substitutes certain for uncertain 
outcomes, and with behavior in financial markets, where investors 
frequently pay to reduce the variance in expected returns. Finally, 
economies of scale to search about reliability flow logically from 
the fact that a large portion of these search costs are fixed. For 
example, a consumer who wants to discover reliability data for 
electric can openers and cars could in both cases go to the public 
library and read ratings in consumer magazines. The cost of both 
searches is close to identical, but the dollar reduction in the range 
of possible losses is much greater for cars because they cost much 
more. Dollars invested in searching for data about cars thus bring 
relatively greater returns than dollars spent in searching for infor- 
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mation about can openers. Greater search should therefore occur 
for precisely those products for which the assumption that con- 
sumers know the odds is most commonly questioned. 
Psychological discussion of "perceived risk" supports the same 
conclusion.78 According to this concept, consumers experience a 
subjective risk when they purchase.74 The size of the perceived risk 
varies directly with the degree of uncertainty and the gravity of 
the perceived potential harm the risk represents. Moreover, people 
are said to dislike risk and to wish to reduce it.75 This can be done 
by reducing uncertainty-by obtaining more information about the 
purchase-or by reducing the potential harm. Intuitively, it seems 
that consumers will opt to reduce uncertainty rather than financial 
impact. Rich people, for instance, may worry about the risk of 
purchasing expensive cars-a Mercedes costs more to replace than 
a Volkswagen-but not many will choose to reduce risk by buying 
subcompacts. Instead, they will seek information about the expen- 
sive cars among which they normally choose. This effect should be- 
come more pronounced as the product involved becomes more ex- 
pensive because the costs of uncertainty grow with the price. 
Hence, the psychological model also predicts that the amount of 
search will increase with product price. 
The evidence is consistent with the predictions of both the eco- 
nomic and psychological models: people seek more information 
about expensive goods than about cheap ones.76 Thus, inadequate 
data about the odds will be a problem only if firms lack sufficient 
incentives to respond to consumer requests. Because information 
about product reliability has public goods aspects, it is difficult to 
7S The perceived risk literature is surveyed in Ross, Perceived Risk and Consumer Behav- 
ior: A Critical Review, 2 Advances in Consumer Research 252 (1975). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See id.; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 5, at 648. A recent study also reported considera- 
ble search for consumer durables and for the credit with which to finance their purchase. 
The average number of store visits by consumers in the researchers' sample was 3.49, and 
these consumers averaged one additional visit to a "cash loan source" such as a bank. Be- 
cause the stores also offered credit, the consumers in fact made several visits to creditors as 
well as to stores. See Shay & Brandt, Public Regulation of Financial Services: The Truth in 
Lending Act, in Regulation of Consumer Financial Services 168, 195-99 (A. Heggestad ed. 
1981). See also Westbrook & Fornell, Patterns of Information Source Usage Among Durable 
Goods Buyers, 16 J. Mkt. Research 303, 305 (1979) (68.6% of consumers in sample visited 
two or more stores when shopping for durable goods; 46.2% also used "neutral" information 
sources such as books and magazines). 
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say that firms will produce the optimal amount of it. Impressionis- 
tic evidence suggests, however, that there is much data about ex- 
pensive, infrequently purchased consumer goods. There are several 
independent rating magazines, and many supposedly disinterested 
publications rate automotive and electronic equipment. Moreover, 
because consumers can learn much about products by using them, 
word of mouth is also a useful information source. Thus, the case 
for systematic consumer optimism must rest more on consumers' 
inability to process data than on the absence of data to process. 
A small but significant exception to this conclusion may exist. 
Suppose an inexpensive, frequently purchased product causes seri- 
ous personal harm a very low percentage of the time. The soda 
bottle that explodes is one obvious example. The chances of explo- 
sion are not revealed by use; rather, explosions just happen. More- 
over, explosions occur so infrequently that consumers may act as if 
they never occur; that is, consumers may act optimistically. Be- 
cause the product is inexpensive, consumers will not find it worth- 
while to search for much information about it. Thus, data that 
would otherwise correct the optimism will not be gathered in the 
course of a general product evaluation. On the other hand, if con- 
sumers are aware that products such as soda bottles can malfunc- 
tion in dangerous ways, it is a separate question whether they un- 
derstate the risk of this harm. 
Consumer misperception must explain systematic optimism re- 
garding the odds of default if such optimism exists. Poor financial 
planning is a significant cause of consumer default. Firms maxi- 
mize profits by lending to people who are likely to repay because 
repayment is a less costly way to collect debts than repossession 
and a lawsuit. Firms accordingly have incentives to refuse credit to 
optimists. Given these incentives, consumers could systematically 
incur debts that their finances should preclude in only two ways. 
First, perhaps firms routinely lend to unjustified risks. Although 
occasional mistakes of this sort occur, there is no reason to think 
that they are made systematically. Second, perhaps consumers 
have more information about their repayment prospects than firms 
do; this information in turn implies a higher likelihood of default 
than does the data available to firms; and consumers systemati- 
cally misprocess this data such that they overestimate their likeli- 
hood of repayment. In other words, consumers may have more 
data with which to assess the risk of default than firms do and 
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thus will act optimistically regarding this risk only if they mis- 
process what they know. 
Health problems and unemployment also may cause default. 
Consumers have more information respecting their own health 
prospects than firms do. Moreover, although a bank may know 
more about the prospects of the auto industry than a potential 
worker/debtor does, the worker probably knows more about his 
chances of avoiding layoffs than the bank does. Again, lack of in- 
formation on which to base an evaluation seems unlikely to cause 
consumer error. That error, if it exists, must depend on consumers' 
inaccuracy in calculating their exposure based on the information 
they possess. 
3. Cognitive Errors and Optimism 
No general theory of how people make inferential judgments ex- 
ists. In recent years, however, psychologists have extensively stud- 
ied how these judgments are made. The central theme of this re- 
search is that people err in ways that are at once serious, 
systematic, and predictable.7 Will these errors cause people in the 
77 This psychological literature is thoroughly reviewed in R. Nisbett & L. Ross, Human 
Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (1980). See also Judgment 
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) 
[hereinafter cited as Judgment Under Uncertainty]. Whether someone is making a cognitive 
error is determined by reference to the task the person is attempting to accomplish. 
Thought processes that routinely generate errors when persons are performing discrete, rela- 
tively simple tasks may work well in environments in which the actors make continuous 
decisions and receive feedback or in environments "of great complexity." See Einhorn & 
Hogarth, Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes of Judgment and Choice, 32 Ann. Rev. Psy- 
chology 53, 73 (1981); Hogarth, Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional and Dysfunctional As- 
pects of Judgmental Heuristics, 90 Psychological Bull. 197 (1981); Lopes, Some Thoughts on 
the Psychological Concept of Risk, 9 J. Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Per- 
formance 137 (1983). In the following discussion, we assume that the task of choosing con- 
tract terms is discrete and relatively simple, so that the thought processes that have pro- 
duced errors in other contexts will produce the same errors in this context. Also, the concept 
of rationality used here has at least two aspects: a person is behaving irrationally if he 
chooses means that are unlikely to achieve his ends or if he pursues crazy ends. The litera- 
ture on cognitive error presupposes the rationality of persons' ends in the environments in 
which these persons are studied, but claims that people pursue these ends irrationally be- 
cause they systematically make mistakes. Because we suppose consumers hold rational pref- 
erences for contract terms, we adopt this approach here and then ask whether consumers 
will make correct choices given those preferences. The entire line of psychological research 
used here is strongly, though in our view not persuasively, criticized in Cohen, Are People 
Programmed to Commit Fallacies? Further Thoughts About the Interpretation of Experi- 
mental Data on Probability Judgment, 12 J. Theory Soc. Behav. 251 (1982). 
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aggregate to misprocess information and therefore understate the 
odds of defects or defaults? This section argues that the principal 
cognitive errors that seemingly plague human inference in most 
cases will cause people to make random errors, will incline people 
toward pessimism in the case of products, or will be irrelevant to 
the question whether people generally are optimistic or pessimistic 
respecting the odds. 
a. The Odds of Product Failure 
Four sources of cognitive error could affect people's assessment 
of the odds of product defects: cognitive dissonance, misuse of the 
"availability" and "representativeness" heuristics, and a possible 
tendency to ignore very low probability events. The cognitive dis- 
sonance idea derives from the theory of cognitive consistency. Ac- 
cording to this theory, people resist holding in awareness two con- 
flicting ideas simultaneously. Thus, they tend to ignore or distort 
evidence relevant to the truth of one of these ideas.78 For example, 
people are said to believe that they are intelligent and prudent and 
consequently will make intelligent and prudent choices; hence, the 
theory predicts that people will devalue evidence that impeaches 
their choices after these choices have been made. A fair amount of 
evidence supports the theory. As illustrations, workers taking jobs 
in unsafe occupations apparently come to believe that the indus- 
tries are safe-"smart, careful people would not work in dangerous 
places." Similarly, some buyers may have more affirmative atti- 
tudes towards products after purchasing than before.79 
Cognitive dissonance seemingly could not cause persons to ig- 
nore unfavorable information in the case that concerns us, when 
consumers are deciding whether to buy. Consumer purchases of 
major items are discrete events that have high salience; people 
view them as beginnings-"my new car." Dissonance is unlikely to 
occur when people consciously gather evidence in order to decide. 
78 An analysis of cognitive dissonance as it applies to economic issues is found in Akerlof 
& Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 307 
(1982). A difficulty with the discussion in the next few pages follows from a difficulty with 
the psychological literature itself. This literature seldom asks when any of the four sources 
of cognitive error that we discuss are more likely to occur than the others. Instead, it com- 
monly analyzes them in isolation. Accordingly, we follow the unsatisfactory practice of dis- 
cussing each of these possible sources of error largely as if no other source existed. 
79 Id. at 308-10. 
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Even where consumers' self-images are not at stake in their esti- 
mation of product risks, the method they use to assess those risks 
may be flawed. The "availability heuristic" can cause persons to 
make mistakes about the frequency with which events occur. One 
making inferential judgments by use of this heuristic tends to ig- 
nore statistical data in favor of evidence that seems germane and is 
"in awareness"-is available. For example, a person may under- 
state the correlation between cigarette smoking and lung cancer 
because his judgment of this correlation was excessively influenced 
by his knowledge of two neighbors, each of whom smoked for fifty 
years and died of stroke. The availability heuristic misleads when 
the association between cause and effect that is in awareness, or is 
easily summoned up, correlates poorly with the frequency with 
which possible causes and effects actually are covariant, as in the 
cigarette example. Psychologists believe that such mistakes occur 
frequently because the existence of evidence in awareness is largely 
a function of its "vividness"-its emotional interest, ability to 
evoke imagery, spatial and temporal proximity, and concreteness.80 
Vivid evidence is not necessarily the most probative evidence. 
If people actually use the availability heuristic to judge product 
reliability, their errors should in the aggregate either be random 
(and therefore unbiased) or pessimistic. Respecting the first possi- 
bility, suppose potential car buyers assess the reliability of new 
Saabs not by published repair data but by reference to what they 
know about cars in general and by what they can recall about 
Saabs. Evidence of this sort will include rumor and the stories of 
acquaintances, and it is likely to suffer from the biases of small 
sample sizes: any one person's sample will have too few data points 
to reveal the correct odds for a particular model. Yet, although 
faulty, the method will generate estimates that are influenced by 
the true odds. Everyone has some knowledge of how cars in general 
perform, and the performance of Saabs is not excessively dissimilar 
from the norm. More important, the results of each person's sam- 
ple will be affected by how reliable Saabs actually are. If Saabs 
always broke down, no one could have a friend with a good word to 
say about them. Finally, the errors that this method of assessing 
data generates are unlikely to lean in one direction. Some people 
may have had good experiences with cars or know people with 
80 R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 77, at 45-59. 
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good Saabs while others may have had bad experiences or know 
people with bad Saabs. Hence, if the availability heuristic influ- 
ences consumer estimates of the odds of product breakdown, those 
estimates should be unbiased in the aggregate. 
If they are not random, consumer errors will likely tend toward 
pessimism because negative evidence is often more vivid than posi- 
tive evidence. This fact explains why people tend to draw insuffi- 
ciently strong inferences from events that fail to happen.81 If a 
product performs well most of the time but fails noticeably, people 
may believe it less reliable than it is because they give too little 
weight to the absence of failure, and too much weight to its pres- 
ence. In addition, psychologists refer to a familiar "script" for de- 
fective cars. Scripts are dramatic stories people tell themselves to 
organize thought and experience: 
Once evoked, this [automobile] script in turn can elicit a wealth of 
additional images and stored episodes about other "lemons" one 
has known. The "lemon" script is particularly rich and potent. 
With its cast of characters (impassive or evasive service managers, 
bumbling mechanics, snickering neighbors who told you that you 
could have had a nice Blatzmobile for half the price), and its stock 
scenes (waiting for buses in the rain, begging rides, bringing the car 
home only to hear some ominous new sound as you pull into the 
driveway), the lemon script is capable of strongly influencing one's 
inferences and behavior. Mere statistics describing drive-train de- 
pendability records or average per-year costs are less likely to call 
up the rich and evocative lemon script and its various instantia- 
tions and are consequently less likely to influence our inferences 
and behavior.82 
In consequence of the vividness of much information about prod- 
uct failure and the relative pallidness of information about reliabil- 
ity, consumers in the aggregate may overestimate the likelihood of 
defects. 
Another source of cognitive error that might lead to mistaken 
estimates of the odds is what psychologists have labeled the "rep- 
S Id. at 45-49. 
s Id. at 54. Consumers appear to attach disproportionate weight to negative information 
about products. See Lynch & Skrull, Memory and Attention Factors in Consumer Research: 
Concepts and Research Methods, 9 J. Consumer Research 18 (1982); Mizerski, An Attribu- 
tion Explanation of the Disproportionate Influence of Unfavorable Information, 9 J. Con- 
sumer Research 301 (1982). 
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resentativeness heuristic." A considerable amount of evidence sug- 
gests that, when seeking an event's cause, people are strongly influ- 
enced by superficial likenesses between some possible causes of the 
phenomenon under study and the phenomenon itself. The "gam- 
bler's fallacy" is one illustration of the error that outcomes "re- 
present" their underlying causes. Each turn of a fair roulette wheel 
or the toss of a fair coin is uncorrelated with prior turns or tosses. 
Therefore, the probability that a particular turn will be red is 
slightly less than .5 (a zero and double zero exist), and the 
probability of heads is approximately one half. If a long run of 
blacks or tails has occurred, a victim of the gambler's fallacy will 
assign a much greater probability than fifty percent to the chance 
that the next turn will produce a red or the next toss a heads. This 
mistake is believed to occur because people perceive the process 
that generates outcomes to be random, and random sequences of 
reds and blacks or heads and tails seem more representative of 
such a process than a long run of blacks or tails.83 
The apparent pervasiveness of the gambler's fallacy suggests 
that people might make pessimistic assessments of product relia- 
bility. Most products, particularly appliances, work reliably. Yet 
consumers know that appliances are made by people, that human 
error often exists, and that industrial workers may lack the sense 
of craft their ancestors had. A consumer whose appliances work 
well and who sees the manufacturing process in this way could be- 
lieve his next purchase will be less reliable than his last: consistent 
success is unrepresentative of a system characterized by human er- 
ror and a lack of craft sense. In the gambler's fallacy, the consumer 
errs by overstating the correlation between present and past-a 
run of heads implies a tails next time. For product purchases, the 
analogous error would assume that too many product successes im- 
ply a forthcoming failure. There is some evidence that consumers 
actually make this error. A study by the University of Michigan 
Survey Research Center reported that people perceived a need for 
repairs in new home appliances that was much greater than their 
"8 See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representative- 
ness, in Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 77, at 32; Zukier, The Dilution Effect: 
The Role of the Correlation and the Dispersion of Predictor Variables in the Use of 
Nondiagnostic Information, 43 J. Personality Soc. Psychology 1163 (1982). 
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actual need for repairs in the past.84 Hence, use of the representa- 
tiveness heuristic may bias people toward pessimism. 
In addition to cognitive consistency and the biases in mental 
processes just discussed, consumers may ignore very low 
probability risks, even though these risks cause catastrophe when 
they do materialize. For example, people buy less flood and earth- 
quake insurance than the objective probabilities of those disasters 
warrant.85 Similarly, personal injuries are a much less frequent 
consequence of product defects than ordinary malfunction. People 
may therefore optimistically ignore the odds that products will 
physically harm them and demand less warranty protection against 
personal injuries than they should.86 
This possibility cannot be dismissed, but, aside from one narrow 
exception,87 it provides a shaky basis for policy judgments. At the 
outset, the mental process that underlies the refusal to insure phe- 
nomena is unclear. Some argue that it reflects cognitive disso- 
nance.88 "A smart, prudent person would not buy a farm that has a 
nontrivial risk of being destroyed by flood." Thus, people who own 
farms will ignore evidence of flood danger, and studies show that 
people in this circumstance are inadequately informed about the 
possibility of natural disasters.8 This explanation implies that 
farm owners discount the risk of flood after purchasing the farm 
because only then have they chosen wisely or foolishly. Accord- 
ingly, even if the same effect applies to consumer product 
purchases, it will not necessarily affect consumers' prepurchase es- 
timate of the odds of breakdown. The flood risk example could in- 
dicate consumer optimism about product risks only if research 
showed that the price of land did not reflect the risk of flood-in 
" See Courville & Hausman, Warranty Scope and Reliability Under Imperfect Informa- 
tion and Alternative Market Structures, 52 J. Bus. 361, 372-73 (1979) (citing study; authors 
do not interpret the results). 
86 Much of this research is described in Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Regulation of 
Risk: A Psychological Perspective, in Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences (R. Noll ed. 
forthcoming 1983). See also Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Corrigan & Combs, Preference 
for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. Risk & Ins. 237 
(1977). 
Cf. Note, Enforcing Waivers in Products Liability, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1111, 1127-36 (1983) 
(arguing that high probability risks of malfunction and low probability personal injury risks 
should be "packaged" to avoid consumer misperception problems). 
"7 See infra text p. 1442. 
" See Akerlof & Dickens, supra note 78. ' See, e.g., id. 
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other words, that buyers of farms discount low probability risks 
when making purchase decisions. Such evidence does not now 
exist. 
The tendency to ignore low probability events may also reflect 
use of the availability heuristic. These sorts of events may seldom 
be in awareness because they occur rarely, so people respond inad- 
equately to them. Some grounds exist for believing that the availa- 
bility heuristic is partly responsible for the phenomenon. For ex- 
ample, while people seem insufficiently concerned with flood, fire, 
and earthquake, they express great concern about the risks of nu- 
clear power and recombinant DNA, although the probability that 
these phenomena will cause harm is quite low. This may be be- 
cause these latter risks are more "available," as they are much dis- 
cussed and would cause awful harm if they materialized; there may 
be "scripts" for nuclear meltdowns and genetic mutations. 
If the availability heuristic is actually at work, it is premature to 
base policy on the penchant of people sometimes to ignore low 
probability events. What is needed but does not exist is a way to 
link the extent to which events may be in awareness with the ob- 
jective probabilities that persons tend to ignore. For example, if a 
product carries a .01 risk of causing personal injury, will people act 
as if that risk is zero? How can a decisionmaker know when a risk 
of a particular harm is below the threshold of attention? If people 
are concerned about nuclear power but unconcerned about floods, 
could they be similarly concerned about cars but not about 
skateboards? That is, if it is the availability heuristic that is mis- 
leading people, are generalizations about odds thresholds war- 
ranted?90 Until cognitive theory develops enough to permit an- 
90 Surveys show that people overestimate the frequency of deaths from some causes such 
as accidents, homicides, and tornadoes and underestimate the frequency of deaths from 
other causes such as smallpox vaccination, diabetes and asthma. Researchers have attrib- 
uted these mistakes to the availability heuristic. See Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, Facts 
versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 
77, at 463, 466-67. 
Psychologists have sought to develop general theories that explain the use of the heuris- 
tics described above. Two observers recently stated: "[A]ll these theories claim that in an 
inference situation the subject's decision is a function of a subset of the most salient dimen- 
sions which are processed sequentially in order of salience." Wallsten & Barton, Processing 
Probabilistic Multidimensional Information for Decisions, 8 J. Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition 361, 362 (1982). Results of experimental tests are consis- 
tent with this hypothesis but also are far from conclusive. See id. The hypothesis does sug- 
gest, though, that the failure to insure against some low probability events is a function of 
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swers to questions of this sort, that people insure insufficiently 
against certain kinds of low probability events cannot support fac- 
tual inferences respecting other such events. In the absence of such 
inferences, it seems unwise to require insurance by mandating 
warranties. 
An exception to this conclusion may exist for frequently pur- 
chased, inexpensive items that cause serious personal harm a very 
small percentage of the time. No case for optimism in the purchase 
of these products can be derived from the representativeness or 
availability heuristics, but optimism may be implied by the cogni- 
tive dissonance paradigm. This is because consumers often will 
learn about the possibility of dangerous malfunction after they 
have made a commitment to the product, for they frequently 
purchase it. Such negative information could be devalued. The risk 
that serious personal harm may occur from using such products as 
soda in bottles, nonprescription drugs, and food thus could be in 
the class of risks against which insufficient insurance tends to be 
purchased. 
b. The Odds of Default 
Are people optimistic respecting the odds of their own defaults, 
such that they will resist a creditor's demand for security less than 
their own better-informed preferences would dictate? This ques- 
tion differs from the one just asked about products, for there the 
issue was whether consumers could correctly infer an objective fre- 
quency-the odds that a product would fail. In this case, people 
must predict the joint influence of their own abilities and objective 
circumstances. For example, a person about to take out an auto 
loan must consider whether he or she is a sufficiently prudent 
manager to be able to make the payments under stable personal 
financial circumstances and must also assess the likelihood of un- 
employment. People generally have as much data about their own 
abilities as outsiders do; we also have argued that they are likely to 
have as much data about their objective circumstances as others 
will have.91 The question we take up here is whether the cognitive 
errors people may make in processing this data will bias them in 
the low salience these events have for the persons they may affect. 
91 See supra pp. 1434-35. 
[Vol. 69:1387 1442 
Imperfect Information 
particular directions. 
Current psychological theory suggests that people assess them- 
selves in the same way that they assess others.92 In particular, peo- 
ple seem to search for causal candidates to explain their own traits 
and actions, use theories to evaluate these possible causes, and 
make inferential judgments about them from objective events, just 
as they do when assessing outsiders.93 Self-knowledge seems a 
product of much the same process as knowledge of others. For ex- 
ample, one may come to see himself as prudent not by consulting 
some peculiarly private source revelatory of his traits, but by infer- 
ring that characteristic from facts concerning how he conducts his 
own financial affairs. If people actually make self-assessments in 
this fashion, an outsider who observed these same facts would 
draw the same conclusion respecting the existence of prudence 
that the person himself did. Evidence shows that when actors and 
observers use the same theories and evidence to assess the actors' 
attitudes and judgments, the two groups reach similar conclu- 
sions.94 Actors, however, are believed to have an advantage over 
observers because actors have more information about themselves 
and their circumstances.9 Thus, if actors and observers have the 
same notion of prudence, a typical actor will be able to summon up 
more instances of his or her own behavior relevant to the existence 
of this trait than any observer can. 
This analysis implies that a consumer/actor will make at least as 
good a judgment of how the interaction between his or her traits 
and circumstances will influence repayment prospects as will a 
bank/observer unless the consumer uses inferior theories to assess 
this interaction or uses the same theories as banks do but applies 
them badly. Both possibilities are nontrivial, but neither would 
bias consumers in particular directions. 
The clearest example of the first problem is the common "funda- 
mental attribution error." Attribution theory in psychology "is 
92 See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 77, at 195. 
93 See id. 
I See id. at 195-225. 
9" See generally id. (actors usually more accurate than observers because actors possess 
more data, but observers sometimes possess superior data and theories); K. Shaver, An In- 
troduction to the Attribution Process 73-92 (1975) (actors should have more complete infor- 
mation than outsiders, but many people seem not to be in touch with their own dispositions 
despite this information advantage). 
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concerned with the attempts of ordinary people to understand the 
causes and implication of the events they witness."96 The funda- 
mental attribution error is to place too much weight on charactero- 
logical factors and too little weight on situational ones when as- 
sessing or predicting behavior. For example, people tend to 
attribute an honest act to an honest disposition rather than to the 
presence of factors that encourage honesty such as the monitoring 
of behavior or the need for the approval of others. Attributions are 
said to be mistaken in life because psychologists have been able in 
laboratories to induce actors to perform widely divergent behaviors 
by varying situational factors.97 Environments may, in short, influ- 
ence behavior more than many people believe. 
Regarding the risk of default, one might suppose that consum- 
ers, when assessing this risk, place too much weight on their own 
traits such as prudence and too little weight on situational factors 
such as a shaky economy. If people ordinarily think highly of their 
abilities, they will then be more sanguine about their repayment 
prospects than their circumstances actually warrant. The funda- 
mental attribution error, however, partly derives from the availa- 
bility heuristic: people commonly have more salience for observers 
than situations have; as a result, observers tend to focus more on 
the influence of actors than on their environments. If this explana- 
tion is correct, people should commit the fundamental attribution 
error less when assessing their own behavior than when evaluating 
others' actions. The actor, being always present, has relatively less 
salience for himself than circumstances do. The evidence is consis- 
tent with this prediction: actors tend to see their own behavior as 
situationally determined while observers see the same behavior as 
dispositionally determined.98 Hence, at this early stage in the un- 
6 Ross & Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and Main- 
tenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 77, at 
129. 
,7 See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 77, at 202-17. 
,8 See id. at 123-24; Kiesler & Munson, Attitudes and Opinions, 26 Ann. Rev. Psychology 
415, 429-30 (1975). A recent review of the relevant research concludes that both actors and 
observers tend to attribute more importance to traits than to situations when making attri- 
butions, but people have a greater tendency to attribute causality to the environment when 
assessing their own actions than when assessing the actions of others. That is, actors commit 
the fundamental attribution error less than observers do. See Watson, The Actor and the 
Observer: How Are Their Perceptions of Causality Divergent?, 92 Psychological Bull. 682 
(1982). The experimental evidence supports the relative salience explanation of this phe- 
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derstanding of these issues, there seems an insufficient basis on 
which to predict that people will be systematically optimistic about 
the odds because, thinking well of their abilities, they are led by 
the fundamental attribution error to give those abilities undue 
weight. 
Lay persons also tend to slight statistical data. A bank officer, 
for instance, will likely use past rates of default among similar con- 
sumers to guide lending practices," while individual borrowers 
may rely on less probative factors such as their own and their 
friends' histories. The errors that such methods could cause seem 
random. As an illustration, most people know that job loss is an 
important cause of default. If they evaluate this possibility by use 
of the availability heuristic, they may overstate the likelihood of 
job loss if they personally know unemployed persons and under- 
state it if they do not. The effect of these errors is presumably 
random.100 People may use the representativeness heuristic and 
ask themselves whether their own traits and circumstances are rep- 
resentative of high- or low-risk debtors, rather than use statistical 
data on default rates.101 This inferential process will mislead unless 
the traits that consumers believe predict default correlate strongly 
with the traits that actually do predict it. Unfortunately, no one 
nomenon-environments are less vivid for observers than for actors. Id. at 698. 
Another explanation, called "prediction and control," also has some evidentiary support. 
According to this theory, actors see their own traits and response patterns as to some extent 
immutable. Thus, actors can maximize "their ability to predict and control future events by 
focusing on the response requirements of specific situations and on the effects that these 
situations have on their behavior." Id. at 692. In contrast, observers need to understand the 
persons with whom they deal; thus, they can enhance their ability to predict and control 
events "by categorizing people they meet according to important trait dimensions." Id. This 
explanation is consistent with our view that persons will give appropriate weight to situa- 
tional factors when assessing their own creditworthiness. 
" The factors that credit managers should and do consider when making consumer loans 
are summarized in R. Brealey & S. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 573-76 (1981). 
100 At any given time, more people are employed than unemployed, so that more borrow- 
ers may discount the risk of unemployment than overstate it. Still, unemployment is more 
vivid than employment, so those with jobless friends will probably err more strongly than 
those who know only people with jobs. Moreover, those who know many unemployed people 
are precisely those who themselves have a high risk of unemployment, such as workers in a 
factory where layoffs are common. Thus, high rates of employment do not imply aggregate 
consumer optimism about the odds of job loss. 
101 Some evidence exists that inexperienced persons may use the representativeness heu- 
ristic when attempting to predict bankruptcy. See Johnson, Representativeness in Judgmen- 
tal Predictions of Corporate Bankruptcy, 58 Acct. Rev. 78 (1983). 
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knows whether consumers routinely focus on the wrong traits, nor 
is it known in which direction their errors run. 
In sum, people may sometimes use inferior theories to evaluate 
the odds of their own default, but there is no reason to believe 
these theories will routinely lead to optimism. Moreover, people 
will often use the same theories that banks use: in assessing their 
fitness to assume debt, people will probably look to their own in- 
comes and job histories just as lending officers do. Potential debt- 
ors probably make more mistakes when using these theories than 
do banks because the debtors have less expertise. But again, there 
is no reason to think that these mistakes lead to a systematically 
optimistic bias, nor is there any way to know how serious they are. 
B. The Assumption That Consumers Cannot Affect the Odds 
We supposed earlier that consumers could not affect the odds 
that they will default or that the products they buy will fail. If this 
assumption is relaxed, two possible difficulties could exist. First, 
moral hazard might affect warranty coverage. Second, consumer 
preferences for contract terms could be heterogeneous. Moral haz- 
ard has little effect on the conclusions reached earlier, but the exis- 
tence of heterogeneous consumer preferences may make it difficult 
to evaluate actual market outcomes by using our warranty and se- 
curity interest models. 
Moral hazard might exist because the marginal cost to a con- 
sumer of using a product carefully is positive, for time and effort 
are costs, while the marginal gain of extra care is apparently zero 
to one who has purchased warranty coverage, for the warranty in- 
sures the consumer against product-related harms. Hence, consum- 
ers protected by warranties could be less careful in their use of 
products than consumers who do not have warranties. The war- 
ranty, in short, might create a "moral hazard." 
Moral hazard seems unlikely to exist in warranty markets. The 
standard market response to moral hazard is coinsurance: the in- 
sured bears part of the risk of accidents, as with deductibles in 
insurance policies. The portion of the risk retained by the insured 
gives him an incentive to avoid accidents. Even broad consumer 
warranties employ a form of coinsurance. Consumer durables are 
bought for use, and buyers seldom keep spares. Moreover, firms 
require many warranted repairs to be made off the consumer's 
premises. Consequently, product breakdown imposes substantial 
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costs on consumers in lost use even when firms fulfill their war- 
ranty obligations. The marginal gain of being careful is therefore 
always positive and often large. Because of this, moral hazard will 
seldom be a serious problem. 
Also, the possible existence of moral hazard does not signifi- 
cantly affect conclusions about how warranty markets work. Ini- 
tially, the existence of moral hazard will increase the likelihood 
that competitive equilibria are sustainable. When all consumers 
prefer warranties, a,sw < min taw, a N} is a necessary and suffi- 
cient condition for an equilibrium in which all firms offer the prod- 
uct with a warranty at the competitive price. Here, sw, the level of 
output in competitive equilibrium for a firm selling with warran- 
ties, equals s(1 - 7r). If consumers are more careless when they 
have warranties than when they do not, 7r rises and sw falls. The 
intuition behind this mathematical statement is that consumer 
carelessness requires firms to provide more replacements at any 
volume of sales, which in turn causes output to fall. The compara- 
tive advantages to firms of selling with and without warranties re- 
spectively are: aw = (F + F')/hw - cw and aN = F/(hN - c). If 
moral hazard exists, warranties are more important to consumers 
because warranties will save consumers greater precaution costs; 
consequently, hw rises more than cw, thereby causing aw to fall. If 
the fixed costs of making warranties (F') are relatively small, how- 
ever, sw will fall faster than aw. Then, a,sw is more likely to be less 
than min { aw, aN}; a competitive equilibrium is more likely to ex- 
ist. This is not to say that moral hazard is desirable; because it 
increases product-related accidents, it raises costs and thus prices. 
These prices are, however, more likely to be competitive. 
Also, the existence of moral hazard makes it more likely that 
firms will respond to insufficient shopping by raising price rather 
than by reducing coverage. This is because moral hazard causes 
consumers to have a greater desire for warranty protection, and 
the likelihood that firms will have a comparative advantage at sell- 
ing with warranties is largely a function of the strength of con- 
sumer preferences for warranty protection. Stated mathematically, 
moral hazard causes hw to rise and thus causes aw to fall, but 
leaves hN and consequently aN unaffected: moral hazard cannot ex- 
ist when no warranties are made. Because aw falls relative to ca, 
firms are more likely to have a comparative advantage at selling 
with warranties. In sum, should moral hazard occur, competitive 
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equilibria are more likely, and firms are more likely to provide 
warranties when consumers want them, although in either case 
prices will be higher than when consumers are appropriately 
careful.102 
If consumers can affect the odds of product defects, they may 
have heterogeneous preferences for warranty coverage. A consumer 
with ten children, for instance, may prefer a stronger warranty on 
a washing machine than a childless buyer. Variation in consumer 
preferences does not affect our analysis if firms that offer warran- 
ties do not compete with firms that sell without warranties. War- 
ranty and nonwarranty markets will "segment" unless each of the 
following two conditions are met.103 First, consumers who prefer 
warranties will buy products without warranty coverage when that 
is the only choice their shopping uncovers, and consumers who do 
not prefer warranty coverage will nevertheless buy such coverage 
when their search discloses only firms that warrant. If this condi- 
tion is unsatisfied, two markets will exist in each of which homoge- 
neous goods are sold-products with and products without warran- 
ties. Second, the marginal cost to firms of making warranties must 
exceed the willingness to pay for them of consumers who do not 
prefer warranties, but must be less than the willingness to pay for 
them of consumers who want warranty coverage. To understand 
this condition, suppose that the marginal cost of making warran- 
ties exceeds the willingness to pay for them of consumers who do 
and do not want warranties; then, no one would buy a product 
with a warranty. Suppose next that the marginal cost of warranties 
was less than every consumer's willingness to pay for them; then, 
all consumers would buy with warranties. If markets segment be- 
cause this second condition is not met, all consumers in a particu- 
lar market would prefer warranties or none would; this in fact is 
the situation in the warranty model. Neither of these conditions 
'10 The existence of a security interest will not increase the level of moral hazard that 
otherwise exists in loan transactions. A consumer who has granted security is at a disadvan- 
tage after default relative to consumers who have not because security gives a firm greater 
power to compel payment. Thus, consumers who grant security will be at least as careful 
respecting repayment prospects as those who do not. 
103 These conditions are formally derived and explained in Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 
41. The following analysis of segmentation is theoretical background to the previous analysis 
of when firms that offer different warranties actually sell in the same market. See supra pp. 
1418-19. 
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for "nonsegmentation" is trivial, and both must be satisfied for 
warranty and nonwarranty markets to interact. Hence, it is plausi- 
ble to assume that firms selling with and firms selling without war- 
ranty protection often will in effect be competing in separate 
markets. 
When warranty and nonwarranty markets do interact, two 
problems arise. First, competitive equilibria are more difficult to 
sustain.104 Some firms in these markets will sell with warranties 
and some without them. This variety in market offerings dilutes 
the effectiveness of search. To see why, suppose that all shoppers 
visit no more than two stores. If a shopper who prefers warranties 
visits one store that offers them and another that does not, he or 
she is effectively a nonshopper for both products; it is as if all 
firms offered warranties and the consumer went only to one of 
them. The effect is identical for consumers who do not prefer war- 
ranties. In short, if consumer shopping sample sizes are held con- 
stant, the effectiveness of search varies inversely with product and 
contract variety. Because competitive equilibria are a function of 
search effectiveness, they are less likely to occur when markets 
interact. 
A second problem is that no one has yet characterized the out- 
comes that arise in markets in which both products and consumers 
are heterogeneous and not enough shopping occurs to sustain com- 
petitive equilibria. We therefore do not know how firms respond to 
insufficient search in these sorts of markets, nor do we know the 
features by which we can recognize normatively undesirable out- 
comes. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that inter- 
active markets behave much differently than the markets we have 
modeled. Such markets do, for instance, respond favorably to in- 
creased comparison shopping.l10 
I" Id. 
101 See supra note 40; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 41. An additional assumption we 
make that is standard in the economic literature is that each firm sells a single product: 
each firm, for example, sells with warranties or without them, but none offers both. In ac- 
tual markets, firms sometimes sell with a standard warranty, but offer consumers an op- 
tional warranty that is either more extensive or of longer duration than the regular war- 
ranty. The welfare effects of this practice are ambiguous. The gain to consumers is an 
increased likelihood of getting warranties they want at reduced search costs. Because con- 
sumers search for desired warranty coverage as well as for low prices, however, the presence 
of "multicoverage firms" may in fact reduce search, which could cause prices to rise. Regula- 
tion requiring firms to expand warranty coverage has similarly ambiguous welfare effects. If 
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Consumer preferences respecting security interests could also 
vary, although the essential similarity of loan transactions makes 
this less likely than heterogeneity of warranty preference. If secur- 
ity preferences are heterogeneous, however, the analysis just made 
concerning warranties applies. 
C. The Assumption That All Consumers Read the Contract 
We supposed earlier that all consumers read the contract, but it 
may seem plausible to assume that only the shoppers read. In the 
mass transactions that are the subject of our analysis, firms proba- 
bly cannot distinguish the consumers who read from those who do 
not. Hence, if enough shoppers exist to sustain a competitive equi- 
librium, that the nonshoppers do not read is irrelevant; they bene- 
fit from the shoppers' efforts. If too few shoppers exist, however, 
that the nonshoppers fail to read makes it more likely that firms 
will degrade contract content. 
To see how this occurs, we shall begin with warranties and make 
four assumptions. (1) Insufficient comparison shopping exists to 
sustain a competitive equilibrium. (2) All consumers prefer war- 
ranties. (3) Only the shoppers read the contract.106 (4) If all con- 
sumers read the contract, firms would have a comparative advan- 
tage at selling with warranties (aw < ac). A firm that considers 
deviating from the competitive price will sell only to nonshoppers. 
Suppose nonshoppers believe warranties always exist whether 
firms offer them or not. Then, they will have only one limit price, 
hw. In this event, it must be that aw > aN; the comparative advan- 
tage in favor of warranties is the reverse of assumption (4). This is 
because aw is still (F + F')/(hw - cw), but aN is F/(hw - c) rather 
than F/(hN - c); the consumer in effect substitutes hw for hN. Be- 
cause the marginal cost of selling without warranties is less than 
the marginal cost of selling with them (c < cw), it will be that 
consumers would search less because they knew that every firm offers a good warranty, 
prices could rise. On the other hand, if firms must offer warranties only when they have a 
comparative advantage at selling without warranties and search in the market is insufficient 
to generate a competitive equilibrium, the regulation may produce net welfare gains, admin- 
istrative costs aside. 
1MO If even shoppers do not read the contract but compare only price terms, firms may 
degrade contract quality despite consumer preferences. It seems plausible to believe that at 
least shoppers read contract terms if only because warranty terms, which cost firms some 
positive amount to offer, exist in real-world markets. 
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hw - c > hw - cw, or aw > aN; firms that deviate from the com- 
petitive price now have a comparative advantage at selling without 
warranties. This result also is intuitively plausible; when consum- 
ers will pay as much as hw and firms can incur costs as low as c by 
disclaiming, firms selling at hw that do disclaim will need fewer 
customers to break even than firms that warrant. 
If the nonshoppers assume instead that firms will never offer 
warranties, the comparative advantage in favor of warranties again 
is aw > aN, the reverse of assumption (4), and warranties once 
more are less likely to be offered.107 In this case, though, consum- 
ers who do not get warranties pay the "appropriate" price, for 
their limit price is hN and firms could charge no more than this. 
Unlike the former consumers, they would not be paying hw for the 
product without a warranty. 
The nonshoppers' failure to read thus gives firms a comparative 
advantage at selling without warranties. Theorem 3 of the war- 
ranty model shows that in this event, when insufficient comparison 
shopping exists to sustain a competitive equilibrium, some firms 
will still make warranties unless very few consumers shop.108 
Therefore, that the nonshoppers are uninformed about the con- 
tract does not mean that all firms will disclaim warranties in the 
noncompetitive case. It means only that there is a greater likeli- 
hood that firms will respond to insufficient comparison shopping 
by reducing warranty coverage. Moreover, most consumers proba- 
bly do know what the warranty terms in their contracts are.'10 
A similar analysis applies to security terms. If consumers will 
pay to avoid security, it will not be seen; hN - hs > cN - cS. Let a 
firm lend only to nonshoppers-insufficient comparison shopping 
occurs-and let these nonshoppers believe that security is never 
taken whether it is or not. Then they would be willing to pay as 
much as hN for a loan, while security would reduce a lender's costs 
107 When nonshoppers believe warranties do not exist, they have only one limit price, hN. 
Then aw becomes (F + F')/(hN - cw), while aN remains F/(hN - c). Because cw > c, 
hN - w < hN - c. Then aN < aw; firms have a comparative advantage at selling without 
warranties. Intuitively, it is pointless for a firm selling only to nonshoppers to incur the 
additional cost of making a warranty when the nonshoppers will pay no more than a 
nonwarranty limit price. If it would be the case that aN < aw when all consumers read their 
contracts, the analysis is unaffected because the failure of the nonshoppers to read cannot 
reverse the comparative advantage so that it runs in favor of making warranties. 108 See supra text pp. 1411-12. 
'09 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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below those that are incurred without it. In this event, a firm sell- 
ing only to nonshoppers will include a security term. Hence, if the 
nonshoppers do not read, security is more likely to be seen. Again, 
though, comparison shopping can prevent this result, and all con- 
sumers seem aware of security interest terms. Part V nevertheless 
considers reforms that are at least partly responsive to the problem 
that some consumers may not read the contract. 
V. GENERALIZATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Warranty terms allocate the risk of product defects between 
firms and consumers; security interest terms can make loans more 
or less risky for lenders and borrowers. Although both allocate risk 
in consumer contracts, the two have little in common. An analysis 
that applies to both, therefore, probably applies to any contract 
term the function of which is to allocate risk. Regarding any such 
term, a combination of comparison shopping and a sufficient will- 
ingness on the part of consumers to pay for preferred terms should 
cause firms to satisfy consumer preferences. Moreover, consumers 
are unlikely to assess the risks that these terms govern in ways 
that differ widely from those described in warranty and security 
interest markets. 
This suggests that much regulation of contract terms on imper- 
fect information grounds is misconceived. This article focuses on 
contracts for the purchase of consumer goods but its results gener- 
alize to other types of contracts. For example, statutes specify 
terms that must appear in trust indentures, on the apparent 
ground that the indentures sold in unregulated markets provided 
investors with insufficient protection in the event of default.110 A 
trust indenture, however, is only a contract between an individual 
investor and a firm whereby the investor lends money to the firm 
on terms that the firm initially proposes. Because individual firms 
seeking to borrow are unlikely to have structural market power in 
capital markets and because investors or their representatives are 
likely to care about the important terms in indenture contracts, 
our analysis suggests that borrowing firms probably would not re- 
duce the quality of these contracts had they the legal power to do 
11 E.g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. ?? 77aaa et seq. (1982). The purposes and 
results of this statute are discussed in V. Brudney & M. Chirelstein, Corporate Finance 
Cases and Materials 91-97 (2d ed. 1979). 
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so. If investors did not search sufficiently in unregulated bond 
markets, they probably would lend under contracts that contained 
the protections that they wanted but at interest rates lower than 
they would have obtained had they more actively pursued lending 
opportunities. Statutes such as the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 
and other statutes that mandate the use of protective terms in loan 
or stock contracts thus deserve reconsideration in light of our 
analysis. 
The regulation criticized here assumes that consumers often as- 
sess risks incorrectly, supposes that firms exploit these mistakes by 
offering unwanted terms, and responds to this supposed exploita- 
tion by mandating those terms that consumers presumably do or 
should want. Regarding clauses that shift risks, however, firms will 
most likely respond to imperfect information by satisfying con- 
sumer preferences at excessive prices rather than by frustrating 
those preferences. If consumer preferences are entitled to control- 
ling weight, then, regulation should seek to ascertain when pricing 
problems are present and to remedy these problems. 
Before discussing how these regulatory tasks are best done, we 
shall take up an objection to our argument, that our notion of a 
correct choice is too restrictive. Such an argument conceives of 
four forms of imperfect information, so that consumer choice can- 
not be correct unless (1) the consumer knows what he or she is 
choosing, (2) the choice reflects a correct assessment of the odds, 
(3) the choice reflects a correct appreciation of the market oppor- 
tunity set, and (4) the person holding the preference that gener- 
ated the choice correctly predicts that the preference will persist 
over time. We neglect this possible fourth aspect of a correct 
choice. The next section argues that this neglect is justifiable. We 
then return to the general implications for contract terms that de- 
rive from our analysis of warranties and security interests. 
A. Imperfect Information in a Fourth Sense 
A central tenet of liberal theory is that persons' choices should 
control political and market outcomes. This tenet is easily derived 
from utilitarianism as it is commonly understood, from Kantian 
morality, and from Judeo-Christian ethics.111 Liberal theory ac- 
"' See A. Donagan, The Theory of Morality (1979). 
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commodates the existence of imperfect information by recognizing 
exceptions to consumer sovereignty when persons are ignorant of 
the market opportunities or of the risks they face. When either 
exception applies, state intervention of some sort is justifiable 
within the theory to correct for the distorting effect of information 
problems. In recent years, another form of imperfect information 
has been thought to exist. This fourth form is based on the notion 
that the effects of many decisions that people make are felt years 
in the future and people's preferences change over time. Conse- 
quently, a person deciding whether to buy, borrow, or vote must 
consider whether present choices will satisfy future preferences as 
well as present ones. People are said systematically to get this deci- 
sion wrong: they often do not know what they will come to prefer. 
When private decisions involve an important temporal aspect and 
imperfect information in the sense of being ignorant of one's future 
self exists, the state is thought to have a legitimate justification for 
regulation. Decisionmakers should make laws that will satisfy peo- 
ple's future preferences when those are likely to be inconsistent 
with their present preferences.'12 
This fourth aspect of the imperfect information concept cannot 
justify regulation of contract terms because it derives from a form 
of utilitarianism that is unworkable in this context.113 For this sort 
of utilitarianism to work, decisionmakers ("planners") must have a 
comparative advantage in predicting future preferences over per- 
sons whose future desires they wish to predict. At least as to per- 
sonal consumption decisions, this advantage seems nonexistent. A 
person's future preferences are a function of how his or her present 
self will change as a result of internal growth and external circum- 
stances, and of the particular external circumstances. The best 
112 This position is strongly argued in R. Goodin, Political Theory and Public Policy 39-56 
(1982), who also cites earlier papers in the same vein. See also Kennedy, Distributional and 
Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory 
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 624-49 (1982) (arguing for pater- 
nalistic intervention in consumer contract contexts). The phenomenon of changing prefer- 
ences is discussed in detail in J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and 
Irrationality 36-111 (1979). Elster, however, believes that the welfare state is justified not on 
the ground that preferences may change but rather on the apparently distributional ground 
that risk-taking should be a partially cushioned activity. Id. at 85-86. Such distributional 
concerns are irrelevant to the analysis in this article. See supra note 6. 
"s See R. Goodin, supra note 112, at 12-18 (justifying, on utilitarian grounds, regulation 
on the basis of future preferences). 
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predictor of how the self will metamorphose seemingly is the selfs 
own history of change. Persons have much more data about their 
pasts than planners will. A person who today prefers purchasing a 
house to renting an apartment has a lifetime of experiences on 
which to draw when asking herself whether this preference will 
persist. She knows how she has come to feel about previous dwell- 
ing places, how those dwelling places furthered or retarded her 
life's plan or otherwise affected her happiness, how her major con- 
sumption decisions have turned out, and so forth. No planner 
could know as much. Hence, planners could have a comparative 
advantage over persons in predicting future preferences only when 
the planners are better able to predict the occurrence of future 
events that may alter those preferences. 
The future events that could alter preferences respecting past 
consumption choices, however, are likely to be particular to indi- 
viduals. One's present preference for an apartment over a house 
seems more likely to change because of his or her acquiring more 
wealth, a family, or a new hobby than because of changes in the 
political or social landscape. People in general are better predictors 
of changes in their own circumstances than planners are. Thus, 
planners seem better able to predict future preferences regarding 
consumption choices only in the unusual case when those prefer- 
ences change as a result of events of widespread consequence that 
planners are better able to anticipate and comprehend. 
Even this apparent advantage dissolves under analysis. The 
planner has no specific information about each of the many indi- 
viduals whose preferences he or she must predict, and so the task 
is to decide how the typical person's preferences will change as a 
result of major shifts in public policy or social relations. To make 
such predictions requires a theory, of a psychological or psychiatric 
sort, that explains how preferences alter over time in response to 
particular changes in the external environment. No such theory ex- 
ists. In consequence, the likely outcome of attempts to predict fu- 
ture preferences will be the substitution of planners' preferences 
for those of their constituents. A planner who thinks that security 
interests should be banned because they will operate harshly 
against consumers in the coming hard times is strongly predis- 
posed to predict that if security interests are banned consumers 
will come to prefer their absence. 
When planners are authorized to regulate on the basis of per- 
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sons' future preferences but lack both data as to these preferences 
and a theory of preference change, they most probably will plan by 
reference to their own conception of the common good. In conse- 
quence, regulation of consumption decisions on the basis of sup- 
posed predictions of persons' future preferences cannot be justified 
by utilitarianism at all, for such regulation will correlate with these 
preferences only by happenstance. Nor is it easy to derive a justifi- 
cation for such regulation from deontological schemes now in fre- 
quent use, such as those premised on respect for the autonomy of 
persons. Under prevailing notions of political morality, then, cur- 
rent individual preferences respecting contract terms should be re- 
garded as controlling unless imperfect information in its more 
usual senses exists.114 
B. Policy Implications 
When consumers know what their contracts say, imperfect infor- 
mation to which the state should respond may exist in two 
forms-consumers may be ignorant of the market opportunities 
they face or of the odds of misfortune implicit in particular 
choices. The state can respond to either problem by banning a par- 
ticular term or by requiring firms to disclose relevant information. 
1. Banning Contract Terms 
Decisionmakers may ban a particular term altogether. Some 
states, for example, have prohibited disclaimers in sales of con- 
sumer goods.115 We refer to this approach as a "general ban." Al- 
ternatively, the decisionmaker can decide case by case; he or she 
could, for instance, ban disclaimers only when firms in a particular 
market have a comparative advantage at selling without warranties 
and too little comparison shopping occurs there to sustain a com- 
petitive equilibrium. To contrast this with the more generalized 
approach, we label it a "particular ban." 
114 A possible exception to this conclusion may exist for very long-term contracts. Some 
persons may prefer an institutional mechanism that periodically reviews their commitments 
to such contracts as life insurance or home mortgages because these persons know that they 
are likely to change substantially over decades. Self-paternalism of this sort is beyond the 
scope of this article, for the effects of almost all the contract terms we consider will be felt 
in the relative short term. 
115 See supra note 11. 
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General bans are seldom an appropriate response to imperfect 
information about market opportunities. Firms are more likely to 
respond to this form of imperfect information by raising prices for 
terms that consumers want, rather than by offering unwanted 
terms. Hence, general bans will likely be inconsistent with con- 
sumer preferences. Moreover, it apparently takes a relatively small 
amount of comparison shopping to prevent firms from wholly 
neglecting consumer preferences respecting contract terms.16 
Therefore, if one suspects a widespread reduction in contract qual- 
ity because of insufficient shopping, a disclosure solution should 
produce satisfactory results. 
Nor are general bans a solution to imperfect information about 
the odds of misfortune. The relevant questions are whether con- 
sumers systematically underestimate the true odds and, if so, 
whether that error will persist. Answers to these questions are both 
difficult and context-dependent. We argued earlier that people 
may be pessimistic about the risk of product breakdown because 
they attach too much weight to vivid data-spectacular accidents 
are more vivid than mere absence of failure.117 On the other hand, 
vivid positive data about a particular product could have a strong, 
if temporary, influence. A new product may have obvious attrac- 
tions but subtle drawbacks. Accordingly, a decisionmaker should 
presume pessimism or unbiased estimates regarding the risk of 
product failure, yet remain open to the possibility of consumer op- 
timism in particular cases. In such cases, however, the situational 
factors that affect consumer risk assessments could change fairly 
quickly. Once our attractive new product begins to fail in dramatic 
fashion, optimism could give way to pessimistic risk assessment. 
Such changes in situational factors are difficult for decisionmakers 
to predict."8 As a result, general bans based on incorrect consumer 
choice are justifiable only when systematic optimism is both pre- 
"6 See supra text accompanying note 56. 
117 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
18 Recent evidence suggests that this difficulty may be great, for it shows that persons' 
risk assessments are partly a function of mood. Persons who learn about tragic accidents 
may believe for a time that life generally is very hazardous while persons who learn about 
happy events may believe the reverse. See Johnson & Tversky, Affect, Generalization and 
the Perception of Risk, 49 J. Personality & Soc. Psychology 20 (1983). Hence, it is difficult 
to know when particular over or underestimations are the product of transient stimuli or are 
stable. 
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sent and likely to persist. We have identified one such case involv- 
ing frequently purchased, inexpensive items that malfunction so as 
to cause personal injury a very low percentage of the time.19" Strict 
liability is appropriate for transactions involving such products. 
Otherwise, general bans of terms on information grounds seem 
without justification.120 
Case-by-case determinations such as those that courts make 
under the unconscionability doctrine are slightly less problematic. 
One might suppose that decisionmaking by judges in individual 
cases would avoid the rigidity and overbreadth that may inhere in 
general bans. Still, there are three related reasons for not imple- 
menting particular bans through case-by-case judicial decision- 
making. First, imperfect information in the forms discussed here 
will seldom cause firms to reduce contract protections. Firms re- 
spond to consumer ignorance of market opportunities more by 
raising prices than by offering unwanted terms; they exploit con- 
sumer ignorance of the odds of harm only when consumers are op- 
timistic in the aggregate, an apparently unlikely state of affairs. 
Thus, when a contract clause is challenged on information grounds, 
courts should initially presume that the term accurately reflected 
consumer preferences. Second, courts will have difficulty acquiring 
the data required to overcome this presumption. The fact that 
some consumers did not shop or that many consumers might have 
mistaken the odds should not suffice to ban a contract term. In- 
stead, courts must find out whether the factors that correlate with 
poor market performance existed when the term was used. Such 
factors include low levels of comparison shopping, willingness to 
pay for preferred terms, and a pervasive underestimation of the 
odds of harm. Lawsuits involving consumers will seldom have high 
enough stakes to induce litigants to bear the considerable expense 
of producing evidence relevant to these concerns. Finally, because 
firms will generally satisfy consumer preferences regarding con- 
tract terms and because it is difficult to know when firms have not 
"9 See supra text pp. 1434, 1442. 
"0 This analysis implies that the informational assumptions that comparative advantage 
warranty theorists such as George Priest make are less fatal to their conclusions than the 
critics of these assumptions claim. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. Compara- 
tive advantage theorists, however, miss the problem that correct coverage may be offered at 
supracompetitive prices as well as the problem that coverage may be incorrect in the case of 
inexpensive, frequently purchased, occasionally dangerous goods. 
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done so, judges seemingly should base their decision to ban con- 
tract terms at least partly on the gravity of the risk involved. For 
example, one might decide to relax the presumption against bans 
when the contract shifts a large risk to a consumer, as when car 
dealers shift the risk of all product breakdown to car buyers. It is 
in precisely these cases, however, that consumers are most likely to 
search for product information and to pay attention to the infor- 
mation they get. The presumption that firms are satisfying con- 
sumer preferences therefore should become stronger as the stakes 
increase.'21 This suggests that a court should ban a term on infor- 
mation grounds when the risk that the term shifts has a relatively 
low value but the term is widely used, so that the possible total 
efficiency loss it causes could be large, and the evidence suggests 
that it is the wrong term for satisfying consumer preferences. Such 
cases will be litigated infrequently and, in any event, their number 
is uncertain. In short, cases may exist in which judicial banning of 
terms on informational grounds makes sense, but those cases are 
probably few. 
2. Requiring Disclosure 
The apparent solution to consumer ignorance of the odds is to 
require the odds to be disclosed. Unfortunately, this solution is 
simpler in theory than in practice. Decisionmakers face substantial 
practical problems in correctly ascertaining the odds, developing 
concise and comprehensible formats for disclosure, and conveying 
the essential facts in such a way that consumers will pay attention 
to them. For example, a car could fail in several different ways and 
in varying degrees. Aggregating different failure probabilities into 
a composite failure probability seems very difficult, while present- 
ing consumers with a series of discrete estimates may be more con- 
fusing than useful. Moreover, product failure is a function both of 
manufacture and of improper use. Because firms cannot observe 
consumers' use patterns except at great cost, they may be unable 
to disclose true failure probabilities.'22 These problems may vary 
121 An exception to this argument is the case of the low probability, inexpensive, high-risk 
product such as the soda bottle that explodes. This case, however, should be covered by a 
general ban of the sort that the strict liability in tort doctrine enacts. 
"2 See Gerner & Bryant, The Demand for Repair Service during Warranty, 53 J. Bus. 
397, 413 (1980) ("The impact consumers have on ... repairs . .. may have particular im- 
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in their magnitude, but they suggest that strict liability is a more 
efficient solution to consumer ignorance of the odds than 
mandatory disclosure in those cases when ignorance of the odds 
problems are serious. 
Requiring disclosure seems more promising as a means of reme- 
dying ignorance of market choice sets. The extent of comparison 
shopping varies inversely with the costs to consumers of comparing 
market alternatives. Reducing these costs will lead to more wide- 
spread knowledge of the available alternatives. Three different 
types of disclosure might be useful. First, the format in which im- 
portant contract terms are set out should be standardized. Stand- 
ardization is preferable to plain language laws, which commonly 
require contracts to be written in clear and simple fashion.123 Facil- 
itating comparisons across firms is best done by requiring firms to 
use the same language, rather than by allowing uncomplicated but 
different language. Standardization is also a partial response to the 
existence of imperfect information in its third aspect-consumer 
ignorance of what the contract says. Whether a consumer reads a 
particular contract may depend on whether the consumer perceives 
the expected gain from reading to exceed the cost. If a consumer 
once reads a standardized clause that is in common use, the cost of 
reading this clause in subsequent contracts will be much reduced; 
the subject matter would grow more familiar with each reading. 
Thus, standardization not only facilitates comparison shopping but 
could increase overall knowledge of consumer contracts. 
Second, the state might require firms to quote price and major 
terms over the telephone. Quotes need be effective only for short 
periods-"our price is $100 until Friday"-and firms could be free 
to charge less but not more than the quoted prices. Because many 
firms now quote prices by phone, the proposal is not farfetched. 
Problems of too many consumer requests could be remedied by 
permitting firms to limit the number of quotes per caller or by 
requiring them to provide quotes only for expensive items. The 
cost-reducing potential of telephone shopping seems great enough 
for this reform to be tried. 
portance in any attempt to label appliances with their expected failure rates, since in part 
that failure rate will be the result of consumers themselves."). 
123 E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. ?? 42-151 to -158 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 
? 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1982.) 
[Vol. 69:1387 1460 
Imperfect Information 
Third, the state should in some cases help pay to produce and 
distribute lists of the prices and important contract terms that 
firms offer. If consumers have this information before they begin 
to shop, firms will face considerable pressure to offer competitive 
prices and terms, and evidence shows that providing comparative 
price data yields lower prices.124 There are practical difficulties in- 
volved in providing this information,126 but recent technological 
advances offer potentially useful vehicles for transmitting compar- 
ative data. "Teletext" and "videotext" are two such vehicles whose 
utility has been insufficiently explored.12" 
Teletext is a one-way communication system that broadcasts or 
sends information on cable to homes where it appears on television 
screens. Videotext is a two-way system, in which one requests in- 
formation by telephone, and the data is received on a television 
screen. Comparative price and term data could be sent through ei- 
ther medium, and this would plainly facilitate interfirm compari- 
sons. Because cable television companies now sometimes transmit 
price data, the teletext proposal has a real world analogue. In addi- 
tion, the number of both cable channels and subscribers continues 
to multiply. When insufficient shopping seems to be a problem, 
therefore, the state should consider transmitting comparative price 
and term data over selected cable channels or, should it become 
more widely used, over teletext. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The regulation of consumer contracts on information grounds is 
itself uninformed. Imperfect information exists when consumers 
are uninformed about risk, are unaware of the array of choices that 
firms offer, or do not know what the contract says. Firms are likely 
to respond to the second form-ignorance of market opportuni- 
ties-by charging supracompetitive prices for those contract terms 
that consumers prefer, rather than by offering unwanted terms. 
1S4 See supra note 40. 
" See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 5, at 673-77. 
1ae These vehicles are explored in J. Tydeman, H. Lipinski, R. Adler, M. Nyhan & L. 
Zwimpfer, Teletext and Videotext in the United States: Market Potential, Technology, Pub- 
lic Policy Issues (1982). An interesting discussion of how videotext systems can be designed 
to make information available to consumers is Biehal, Implications of Consumer Informa- 
tion Processing Research for the Design of Consumer Information Systems, 17 J. Consumer 
Aff. 107 (1983). 
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The best remedy for this aspect of imperfect information is to re- 
duce the costs to consumers of comparing the offers of different 
firms: comparison shopping drives prices down and reduces further 
the likelihood that firms will frustrate consumer preferences re- 
specting terms. In addition, comparison shopping partly resolves 
the problems that may arise from failure to read contracts. 
Imperfect information in the sense of incorrect choice is thought 
to be pervasive, but this is because decisionmakers and commenta- 
tors focus on representative individual consumers, each of whom 
may lack the data and skill to calculate risks perfectly. Firms, how- 
ever, commonly respond to consumers in the aggregate and not as 
individuals. Thus, the question is whether consumer error in as- 
sessing risks is biased in the aggregate such that firms will act as if 
each consumer makes incorrect choices. If consumers as a group 
err in evaluating the odds in ways that are either systematically 
pessimistic or unbiased, firms generally will respond as if their 
choices were correct. Moreover, pessimistic choices seldom seri- 
ously disadvantage consumers. Firms have an incentive to exploit 
consumers only if consumers routinely understate the adverse con- 
sequences of purchase choices, and an analysis of the psychological 
literature dealing with cognitive error suggests that such system- 
atic consumer optimism respecting the odds seldom exists. 
Much of the regulation of contract terms on informational 
grounds is devoted to "improving" contract quality by banning 
terms that supposedly result from imperfectly informed consumer 
choice. Yet the presumed existence of imperfect information sel- 
dom supports bans of terms with which consumers are familiar. 
Warranties and security interests are examples of such terms, but 
clearly do not exhaust the set. Thus, if consumers actually care 
about important contract terms, legislatures should facilitate com- 
parison shopping for them and courts should ban only those trivial 
terms that seem unfair. 
This conclusion suggests the directions that further research 
should take. Policymakers need to know what terms consumers 
read and understand and which trivial terms are sufficiently unfair 
to ban. As to contract terms that consumers know, attention 
should turn to the difficulties involved in recognizing when mar- 
kets are behaving poorly for informational reasons and to the prac- 
tical difficulties of reducing the costs of comparison shopping. 
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APPENDIX 1: TABLE OF MATHEMATICAL SYMBOLS 
USED IN TEXT 
The following mathematical symbols are defined in the order 
they appear in the text. 
Search Equilibrium Model 
p0 = price actually charged for the product by all firms in a 
market 
PL = consumers' common limit price 
p* = competitive price 
Warranty Markets 
a, = ratio of nonshoppers to total consumers in the market 
a2 = ratio of shoppers to total consumers in the market 
hw = consumers' limit price for the product with a warranty, 
under the assumption that, at competitive prices, all 
consumers prefer warranties 
hN = consumers' limit price for the product without a warranty, 
under the assumption that, at competitive prices, all 
consumers prefer warranties 
pw competitive price for the product with a warranty 
pN = competitive price for the product without a warranty 
Ir = probability of the product's breaking and becoming useless 
F = fixed cost of producing the product 
c = marginal cost of producing the product 
F' = additional fixed costs of offering the product with a 
warranty 
x = number of units of the product sold 
cw = marginal cost of offering the product with a warranty 
s = firm's output in competitive equilibrium when selling the 
product without warranties 
SW = firm's output in competitive equilibrium when selling the 
product with warranties 
auw = comparative advantage of selling the product with a 
warranty, under the assumption that, at competitive 
prices, all consumer prefer warranties 
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aN = comparative advantage of selling the product without a 
warranty, under the assumption that, at competitive 
prices, all consumers prefer warranties 
kw = (h - cw) - (hN - c) 
Iw = consumers' limit price for the product with a warranty, 
under the assumption that, at competitive prices, no 
consumers prefer warranties 
IN = consumers' limit price for the product without a warranty, 
under the assumption that, at competitive prices, no 
consumers prefer warranties 
3w = comparative advantage of selling the product with a 
warranty, under the assumption that, at competitive 
prices, no consumers prefer warranties 
O3N = comparative advantage of selling the product without a 
warranty, under the assumption that, at competitive 
prices, no consumers prefer warranties 
Security Interest Markets 
L = fixed amount of a loan by all creditors 
7r = probability of consumer default 
X = probability of consumer bankruptcy given default 












= value of the used good recovered from defaulting consumer 
= interest rate 
= total amount of funds available for loans 
=total number of loans which can be made by a single firm 
= fixed cost of making loans 
= marginal cost of making loans 
= marginal cost of lending with security 
= marginal cost of lending without security 
=additional fixed costs incurred by a firm if it takes security 
on loans 
=firm's rate of marginal loss from consumer bankruptcy 
= competitive interest rate on a loan without security 
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r = competitive interest rate on a loan with security 
hN = limit rate for a loan with no security term 
hN = limit rate for a loan with a security interest 
Underlying Assumptions 
S = consumer's subjective belief of the odds of product failure 
A = actual odds of product failure 
e = error term reflecting the existence of imperfect in- 
formation about the future occurrence of product failure 
E(S) = expected consumer subjective belief 
E(A) = expected actual odds 
E(e) = expected error 
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APPENDIX 2: IMPERFECT INFORMATION IN CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
We are concerned here with consumer financial markets in 
which lenders may or may not take a security interest in goods 
that consumers will purchase with the loan. Consider a consumer 
who wishes to finance the purchase of a car. He or she goes to a 
bank to obtain a loan. The bank charges some interest rate and 
may or may not take a security interest in the car. The loan is 
made. Afterward, there is some chance that the consumer will de- 
fault on the loan payments. This may be because the consumer 
goes bankrupt or it may be for some other reason. If the consumer 
defaults, the bank sues for breach of contract. If the consumer is 
not bankrupt, the bank recovers in full any unpaid principle. Oth- 
erwise, how much it recovers depends on whether it has taken a 
security interest. If the bank has taken a security interest, it recov- 
ers the car, and if the value of the used car exceeds the unpaid 
principle, it returns the difference to the consumer. If the value of 
the used car is less than the unpaid principle, however, the bank 
must sue to recover the difference. Because the consumer is bank- 
rupt, the bank generally will recover only a portion of this remain- 
ing debt. 
If the bank does not take a security interest and the consumer 
defaults due to bankruptcy, the entire unpaid principle must be 
recovered through the courts. Again, only a portion will generally 
be obtained because the consumer's debts exceed his or her credits. 
Of interest here is whether banks will request security interests 
and how the answer to that question is related to loan rates and 
consumer information. 
To begin a formal analysis of these issues, we assume all loans 
are for a fixed amount, L. The probability of default is ir and the 
probability of bankruptcy given default is 7. The rate of recovery 
in a bankruptcy proceeding is p. The value of the used good is V. 
We also need to specify the "technology" facing the lending in- 
stitutions. We assume that each firm offers loans either with or 
without a security interest, but does not offer a choice. Let r be the 
interest rate they charge consumers. Let S be the total amount of 
funds available for consumer loans and S/L s be the total num- 
ber of loans that can be made. Let F be the fixed costs associated 
with lending in this market and c the marginal (or "opportunity") 
cost, measured as an interest rate, of making loans; i.e., the margi- 
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nal cost of loaning L dollars is cL. Finally, let F' be any additional 
fixed costs associated with taking a security interest (essentially 
the costs of selling used goods on a wholesale market). 
On the demand side, we assume each consumer desires a loan of 
L dollars or none. The total number of consumers is fixed at A. Of 
these, A1 are nonshoppers and A2 are shoppers, the latter of whom 
sample precisely two firms. The ratio of nonshoppers to total con- 
sumers is al = A1/A and the ratio of shoppers to total consumers is 
a2 = A/A. Initially, we assume consumers prefer not to have se- 
curity interests taken. We let hN be the limit price (or interest rate) 
when no security interest is taken and hs be the limit price (or 
interest rate) when a security interest is taken. 
A summary of notation to be used follows: 
L = size of loan 
r = interest rate charged 
r = probability of default 
y= probability of bankruptcy given default 
p = recovery rate in bankruptcy proceeding 
V = value of used good 
S = total funds available for consumer loans 
s = S/L = maximum number of loans 
F = fixed cost with no security interest 
F' = additional fixed cost with security interest 
c = marginal cost of making loans (as an interest rate) 
hN = consumer limit rate given no security interest 
hs = consumer limit rate given security interest. 
In addition, we will use the following: 
k = 7ry(1-p) = expected net marginal loss due to 
bankruptcy 
r = competitive interest rate given no security interest 
r* = competitive interest rate given security interest 
aN = break-even demand for a monopolist taking no 
security interest 
as = break-even demand for a monopolist taking a 
security interest. 
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The Case in Which Consumers Prefer Loans Without Secutiry In- 
terests if Priced Competitively 
Several assumptions will be used in the analysis. 
Assumption 1: L > V. 
This assumption will be used in the following way. To keep 
things simple, dynamic elements of the problem will be ignored. 
This will have no qualitative effect but helps the analytics. In par- 
ticular, all interest rates will be treated as simple interest in a one- 
period framework. No "down-payments" will be made, and any de- 
faults will occur before any of the principle has been paid. Thus, if 
L > V, the used good is worth less than the new good the instant 
it is purchased. Because many defaults occur after some time has 
passed and some payments on the loan have been made, this as- 
sumption captures the most common case-that in which a secur- 
ity interest is not adequate to cover the remaining principle after a 
default. 
Assumption 2: hN > hs. 
This assumption is obvious-consumers are willing to pay more 
if no security interest is taken than if one is taken. Somewhat 
stronger is the following: 
Assumption 3: hN - rN > h - r* > 0. 
Assumption 3 states that consumers prefer no security interest 
to a security interest, given the opportunity to take loans with or 
without a security interest at the relevant competitive price. The 
terms h - r* and hs - r represent consumer surplus and are 
assumed to be strictly positive. 
Two more assumptions of a more specialized and technical na- 
ture will turn out to be useful. 
Assumption 4: F'/s < Vk. 
Assumption 5: hN > Vk/L(1 - 7r). 
The first two of these assumptions guarantees that r* > r, i.e., 
the competitive interest rate on a loan with a security interest is 
less than that on a loan without a security interest. It implies this 
because F'/s is the additional average cost of taking security inter- 
ests when the maximum number of loans are made and Vk is the 
additional gain per loan from taking a security interest since, with 
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a security interest, the value of the used good V is gained before 
the bankruptcy process is initiated and k is the rate of loss from 
being forced into that process. The second assumption is more ob- 
scure. It is equivalent to Assumption 3 except that instead of using 
rN and r, one uses (c + k)/( - r) and [c + k + (Vk/L)/(l - r)] 
respectively. This is the "differentiable" average cost function ana- 
logue to our "fixed cost, constant marginal cost, fixed capacity" 
formulation and is generated by letting F' = 0 = F. Its role in the 
analysis which follows will be made clear. 
To begin this analysis, we need to characterize profits as a fhnc- 
tion of the level of demand, x, and of the interest rate charged 
consumers, r, for firms who make loans with and without a security 
interest. They are denoted 7rs(x;r) and lrN(x;r), respectively. 
Namely: 
Lemma 1: 
lrN(x;r) = Lx[r(1 - r) - c - k] - F, 
7rs(x;r) = Lx[r(1 - r) - c - k] + xVk - (F + F'). 
Proof Consider first no security interest. 
rN(x;r) = [(1 + r)Lx - F - (1 + c)Lx] + 
7rx[-(1 + r)L + (1 - y)L + yLp] 
= Lx{r - c + 7r[y(p - 1) - r] - F 
= Lx[r( - r) - c - k] - F. (1) 
The first bracketed term in this equation represents direct profits 
if there were no defaults. With x loans, 7rx is the expected number 
of defaults. Initially (1 + r)L is lost on each default. But 1 - 
percent of the defaultors are not bankrupt, and for these the entire 
principle L is recovered. For bankruptcies (y percent of the de- 
faults), the recovery rate is p. Hence, the second bracketed term is 
net recoveries given default. Similarly, 
7rs(x;r) = [(1 + r)Lx - (F + F') - (1 + c)Lx] + 
rx { - (1 + r)L + (1 - y)L + y[V + (L - V)p]} 
= Lx r - c + r[- r- y(1 - p)] + xVk- (F + F') 
= Lx [r(l - r) - c - k] + xVk - (F + F'). (2) 
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The difference between this equation and the first is the additional 
fixed cost F' and the additional expected recoveries given default. 
If the consumer is bankrupt, V is recovered with certainty and the 
balance L - V is recovered at rate p because only it is forced into 
the bankruptcy process. Q.E.D. 
Using Lemma 1 we can characterize rN and rs explicitly. 
Lemma 2: 
r*= [(F/Ls) + c + k]/(1 - r) 
rs*= [(F + F')/Ls] + c + k - (Vk/L)}/(1 - 7r). 
Proof: Competitive interest rates are defined by zero profits at ca- 
pacity s. Hence, for no security interest: 
0 = N(s;rN) = Ls[r*(l -- r) - c - k] - F, 
or 
r = [(F/Ls) + c + k]/(l- r). 
Similarly, 
0 = rs(s;r) = Ls[rs*(1 - r) - c - k] + sVk - (F + F') 
which yields rs. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 1 also allows us to express aN and as formally. 
Lemma 3: 
a = F/L[hN( - r) - c - k] 
as= (F + F')/{L[hs(1 - ir) - c - k] + Vk}. 
Proof: By definition aN and ca are break-even demands for monop- 
olists offering loans without and with security interests, 
respectively. 
Hence 
0 = N(aN;hN) = LaN[hN(l - r) - c - k] - F, 
and 
0 = rs(as;hs) = La[hs(l - 7r) - c - k] + asVk - 
(F + F'). 
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Solving for aN and as gives the lemma. Q.E.D. 
A final lemma relating aN to ca will turn out to be of use later. 
Lemma 4: aN < as. 
Proof: From Lemma 3 we have aN < as if and only if 
F/L[hN(1 - r) - c - k] 
< (F + F')/fL[hs(l - 7r) - c - k] + Vk}. (3) 
Simplifying (3), we have aN < as if and only if 
(hN - hs)(1 - r) > 
(Vk/L) - (F'/F)[hN( - ) - c - k]. (4) 
But Assumption 3 states hN - r* > hs - r* which, using Lemma 
2, implies 
hN - [(F/Ls) + c + k]/(l - r) > 
hs - [(F + F')/Ls) + c + k] - (Vk/L)/(1 - r). (5) 
Rearranging (5) gives 
(hN - hs)(l - ir) > (Vk/L) - (F'/Ls). (6) 
Inequality (6) implies inequality (4) and hence the lemma, if 
(Vk/L) - (F'/sL) > 
(Vk/L) - (F'/F)[hN(1 - ) - c - k]. (7) 
Inequality (7), however, reduces to 
sL[hN( - r) - c- k] - F > 0. 
But sL[hN( - r) - c -k] - F = N(s;hN) > 0 since h > r* by 
Assumption 3. Thus, (7) must hold, implying (4) holds, implying 
aN < as, Q.E.D. 
This completes our preliminary analysis. We are now ready to 
consider the possible equilibrium configurations in more detail. 
Equilibrium here is a consumer/firm ratio, a = A/N, a distribution 
of firms between those offering loans with security interest, ns, and 
those offering loans without security interest, nN, and a distribu- 
tion of interest rates in each market, Gs(.) and GN(-), such that all 
firms earn zero profits and no firm can earn positive profits by 
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changing its interest rate. Here 
N = total number of firms 
NN = number of firms without security interest 
Ns = number of firms with security interest 
nN = NN/N 
ns = Ns/N. 
Theorems 1 through 8 all presume Assumptions 1 through 5 
hold. 
Theorem 1: A necessary and sufficient condition for ns = 0 and 
the market for loans without security interests to be competitive 
is a<s < aN. 
Proof: With ns = 0 and the security interest market competitive, 
expected demand at r* must equal s. Hence, = A/N = s. A firm 
entering this market above r* should charge hN because it gets non- N N 
shoppers only. Nonpositive profits thus requires 
alL[hN(1 - r)- c - k] -F < 0 
or, using Lemma 3, ala < aN. A firm entering the security interest 
market should analogously charge hs. Nonpositive profits then 
requires 
a,aL[hs(l - 7r) - c - k] + aluVk - (F + F') 0, 
or a1a < as. But Lemma 4 shows aN < as. Thus, ala < aN implies 
ala < as. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 2: nN = 0 and the market for loans with security inter- 
ests to be competitive is impossible. 
Proof: In this case a = A/N = s again, because capacity is insensi- 
tive to whether a security interest is taken or not. Now h - r > 
h- rs' (Assumption 3) implies there exists an interest rate rN > r* 
such that hN - rN = hs - r*. At this interest rate, consumers are 
indifferent to a loan with no security interest and one with a secur- 
ity interest at rate rs. Hence, a firm entering the market for loans 
without security interests at rN will get expected demand equal to 
s. Profits are then Ls[rN(l - ir) - c - k] - F which is strictly 
positive because rN > r* and Ls[r(l - r) - c - F = 0O by N N NA? LN ~ r J I 
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definition of r* (see proof of Lemma 2). Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3: It is impossible for both markets to be competitive. 
Proof: The proof of this result is analogous to that of Theorem 2. A 
firm charging rN and not taking a security interest must necessarily 
earn strictly positive profits. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 4: A necessary and sufficient condition for ns = 0 and 
the market for loans without security interests to be noncompeti- 
tive is aN < aas. 
Proof: When ns = 0, the highest interest rate in the market for 
loans without security interests is hN. Zero profits thus implies 
aa,L[hN(1 - 1r) - c - k] - F = 0, 
or a = aN/al. 
Now consider the distribution of interest rates in the no security 
interest market, GN(-). Suppose it has a mass point at r* denoted 
G*. Expected demand at rN is 
{a1 + 2a,[l - (G*/2)]j. 
Zero profits then implies 
a{a, + 2a21 - (GN/2)]}L[r(1l - ir) - c - k] - F = 0, 
or 
GN = [(a, + 2a2) - (s/r)]/a2. 
A noncompetitive distribution of interest rates in the no security 
interest market requires GN < 1, or (al + 2a) - (s/r) < a2. Be- 
cause a = aN/al, this reduces to aN < a s. 
What about entry into the market for loans with security inter- 
ests? To calculate expected profits at various interest rates in this 
market, we need to know the exact form of GN(). Expected de- 
mand at interest rate r is ar{a + 2a2[1 - GN(r)] . Hence, if we let 
7rN(x;r) when x equals expected demand at r be denoted 7re(r), 
7re(r) = aoal + 2a1 - GN(r)]}L[r(l - ir) - c - k] - F.(8) 
Zero profits requires 7re(r) = 0 (for those r actually offered). 
Hence, (8) yields 
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F - a,aL[r(1 - 7r) - c - k] 
GN(r) = 1 - (9) 
2a2,L[r(l - 7r) - c -k] 
If a firm enters the market for loans with security interests at rate 
qs, it loses some shoppers to firms offering loans without security 
interests. In fact, at rate qN, where hN - qN = hs 
- 
qs, consumers 
are indifferent and, for any r < qN, they prefer to take a loan with- 
out a security interest at rate r rather than take one with a security 
interest at rate qs. Thus, defining ire(') analogously to 7re(), 
t{a, + 2a[1 - GN(hN - hs + qs)]} 
rse(qs) = - (F + F'). (10) 
L[qs(1 - r) - c - k] + Vk] 
Using (9) in (10) we get 
F{L[qs(l - ir) - c - k] + Vk} 
-re(qs) -(F + F'). (11) 
L[(hN - hs + qs)(l - 7r) - c - k] 
Differentiating (11) with respect to qs gives 
FL(1 - r)[L(hN - hs)(1 - 7r) - Vk] 
d7re(qs)/dq = 
L2[(hN- hs + qs)(l - T) - c k]2 
The sign of d?re(qs)/dqs equals the sign of 
L(hN - hs)(1 - 7r) - Vk. 
But by Assumption 5, this is positive. Hence, drse(qs)/dqs > 0 and 
7re(qs) < 0 for all qs E [r*,hs] if and only if rse(hs) < 0. But from 
(11) this reduces to aN < as, which necessarily holds given Lemma 
4. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 5: nN = 0, and the market for loans with security inter- 
ests to be noncompetitive is impossible. 
Proof: If nN = 0, then the highest interest rate in the market for 
loans with security interests is hs. Zero profits then implies 
a = as/al. A firm entering the no security interest market at hN 
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will attract a,o customers. Profits are then 
alaL[hN(1 - 7r) - c -k] - F, 
which are nonpositive if and only if as < aN, a condition which 
contradicts Lemma 4. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 6: It is impossible for the market for loans both with se- 
curity interests to be competitive and without security interests 
to be noncompetitive. 
Proof: The logic here is the same as in the proofs of Theorems 2 
and 3-expected demand at r* is s. A firm offering rN = h - h + 
r* will also attract s consumers and must therefore earn strictly 
positive profits. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 7: It is impossible for the market for loans both without 
security interests to be competitive and with security interest to 
be noncompetitive. 
Proof: This proof follows as that of Theorem 5-zero profits at hs 
implies a = as/a,, and this consumer/firm ratio necessarily allows 
strictly positive profits at hN, unless aN > as, a condition which 
violates Lemma 4. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 8: It is impossible for both markets to be 
noncompetitive. 
Proof: To prove this theorem we need first to show there cannot 
exist two interest rates in the market for security interests, say Ps 
and qs, such that qN hN - hs + qs and PN = hN - hs + qN are 
both offered in the no security interest market. Suppose there were 
two such interest rates. Expected demand at Ps will equal expected 
demand at PN, and expected demand at qs will equal expected de- 
mand at qN. Define these values by Ds(ps), DN(pN), Ds(qs) and 
DN(qN), respectively. Then zero profits gives 
LDs(ps)[ps(l - 7r) - c - k] + Ds(ps)Vk - (F + F') 
LDN(pN)[pN(1 - r) - c - k] - F (12) 
and 
LDs(qs)[s(1l - ir) - c - k] + Ds(qs)Vk - (F + F') 
= 
LD(qN)[qN(1 - r) - c - k] - F. (13) 
But PN = hN - hs + ps and Ds(ps) = DN(pN). Hence, (12) is 
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equivalent to 
LDs(ps)[p,(1 - r) - c - k] + Ds(ps)Vk - (F + F') 
LDs(ps)[hN - hs + ps)(l - r) - c - k] - F, 
or, 
Ds(ps)Vk - F' = LDs(pS)(hN - hs). (14) 
Solving (14) for Ds(ps) gives 
Ds(ps) = F'/[Vk - L(hN- hs)(l - r)], (15) 
which is independent of Ps and thus must hold for qs as well. 
Hence, Ps equals qs and only one such point can exist. But such a 
point must exist if both markets are noncompetitive. Furthermore, 
Ds(ps) > 0 if and only if Vk > (hN - hs)(1 - 7r), which contra- 
dicts Assumption 5. Thus, no such point can exist because ex- 
pected demand there will be negative. Q.E.D. 
This completes our analysis of the case in which consumers pre- 
fer loans without security interests, given competitive pricing. It 
can be summarized nicely in the following corollary. 
Corollary 1: Under Assumptions 1 through 5, the market for loans 
with a security interest can never exist. The market for loans with- 
out a security interest is competitive if and only if als < aN. It is 
noncompetitive if and only if als > aN. 
If Assumption 5 does not hold, the necessary and sufficient con- 
ditions for ns = 0 and the no security interest market to be non- 
competitive are more restrictive (Theorem 4), and the possibility 
of both markets being noncompetitive arises (Theorem 8). 
The Case in Which Consumers Prefer Loans With Security Inter- 
ests if Priced Competitively 
We now want to consider a situation in which consumers prefer 
to have loans made with security interests if they are priced com- 
petitively; i.e., the reduction in price from rN to rs is more than 
enough to compensate consumers for the presence of the security 
interest. Some new notation will be needed. In this case, we let IN 
be the limit rate for loans without a security interest and Is be the 
limit rate for loans with a security interest. We also let 3N and Os 
be the break-even demands for monopolists charging IN for loans 
without a security interest and ls for loans with a security interest, 
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respectively. The relevant assumptions for this case are: 
Assumption 2': lN > Is 
Assumption 3': 0 < I1 - r* < I - r* 
Assumptions 1 and 4 remain unchanged and the analogue to As- 
sumption 5 can be stated as a lemma. 
Lemma 5: 1N - 1 < Vk/(1 - r)L. 
Proof: We know from Assumption 3' that IN - I < rN - r*. But 
r* - r* = [Vk/L(1 - r)] - [F'/sL(1 - 7r)]. 
Hence, IN - 1s < Vk/(1- r) if 
[Vk/L(1 - ir)] - [F'/sL(1 - ir)] < Vk/(1 - ir)L, 
which obviously holds because 0 < r < 1. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 6: 
iN = F/L[IN(1 - ir) - c - k] 
3s = (F + F')/IL[ls(1 - r) - c - k] + Vk}. 
Proof: This result follows as Lemma 3. Q.E.D. 
Lemmas 1 and 2 are still valid. The analogue to Lemma 4, how- 
ever, now fails; that is, fN and Os bear no particular relation to each 
other. 
Theorems 9 through 16 are analogous to Theorems 1 through 8. 
All presume Assumption 1, 2', 3' and 4 hold. 
Theorem 9: It is impossible for ns = 0 and the market for loans 
without security interests to be competitive. 
Proof: With ns = 0 and all loans with no security interest priced at 
r, a = A/N = s. A firm offering loans with security interests at Ts, 
where r is defined by I - = I - r, will also attract s consum- 
ers. Profits are then: 
r(s;rs) = Ls[rs(1 - r) - c - k] + sVk - (F + F'), 
which are strictly positive because 7rs(s; rs*) = 0 by definition and 
rs > rs Q.E.D. 
Theorem 10: A necessary and sufficient condition for nN = 0 and 
the market for loans with security interests to be competitive is 
als < min I{N' /3S} 
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Proof: The proof of this result is similar to that of Theorem 1. 
With nN = 0 and all loans with security interests priced at rs, a = 
A/N = s. Nonpositive profits at Is reduces to als < Os and 
nonpositive profits at 1N reduces to als < N'. Because ON and /Os 
bear no special relation to each other, both constraints are 
relevant. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 11: It is impossible for both markets to be competitive. 
Proof: This proof is analogous to that of Theorem 9-a firm charg- 
ing rs and taking a security interest must necessarily earn strictly 
positive profits. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 12: A necessary and sufficient condition for ns = 0 and 
the market for loans without security interests to be noncompeti- 
tive is: 
Vk - L(1N - Is)(1 - T) < alF'/lN(a, + 2a2). 
Proof: With ns = 0 and the no security interest market noncom- 
petitive, the highest price in the latter must be N. Hence, a = A/N 
= N/a by zero profits. Furthermore, GN(r*) = 0; there can be no 
mass at r* because, if there were, firms could enter at Tr and earn 
strictly positive profits (see the proof of Theorem 9). Let tN be the 
lowest price in the no security interest market actually offered and 
define ire(r) to be equal to 7rN(x;r) when x is the expected demand 
at r. Then 
re(tN) -= a(a1 + 2a2)L[tN( - 7r) - c - k] - F. 
Zero profits then gives 
tN = [F/aL(a, + 2a2)] + c + kJ/(l - r). (16) 
It must be that tN > rN. Using (16) and Lemma 2, this reduces to 
a1s > fN(al + 2a2). But this is implied by Assumption 3'. 
What about entry into the market for loans with security inter- 
ests? As in the proof of Theorem 4, we have for any r e [tN,/N], 
7re(r) = aca, + 2a2[1 - G(r)]}L[r(l - r) - c - k] - F. 
Using 7re(r) = 0, this gives 
F - a,aL[r(1 - 7r) - c - k] 
GN(r) = 1 - . (17) 
2a2aL[r(l - ir) - c - k] 
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Let ts be defined by - ts = IN - tN. Then for any qs e [ts,/s], 
{a, + 2a,[ - GN(IN - + qs)]} 
re(qs) = - (F + F'), (18) 
L[q(1 - 7r) - c - k] + Vk 
where 7rse() is defined analogously to Ire(.). Using (17) in (18), we 
get 
F{L[qs(1 - r) - c - k] + Vkl 
se(qs) = - (F + F'), 
L[(lN - s + qs)( - r) -c - k] 
and differentiating, 
FL(1 - lr)[L(N - Is) (1 - T) - Vk] 
dre(qs)/dqs = 
L [(1N - I + qs)(1 - r) - c - k]2 
Now Lemma 5 implies that the bracketed term in the numerator is 
negative. Hence, we need only guarantee 7rse(ts) < 0 to prevent en- 
try into the no security interest market. But ts = ls - IN + tN. 
Hence, 
F[L[(Is - 1N + tN)(l - Tr) c - k] + Vk} 
7rs(t) - (F + F'). 
L[t( 1 - r) - c - k] 
Using (16), this reduces to 
rse(ts) = (a, + 2a2)[Vk - L(N - ls)(1 - 7r)] - F'. 
Because a = SN/a,, irse(t) < 0 can be stated in the form given in 
the Theorem. Note that because Lemma 5 implies Vk - 
L(N - ls)(1 - r) > 0, this constraint is nontrival when F' > 0. 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 13: Necessary and sufficient conditions for nN = 0 and 
the market for loans with security interests to be noncompetitive 
are: 
(i) Os < a,s, 
(ii) Os < N'. 
Proof: With nN = 0, the highest rate in the securities market must 
be ls. Zero profits then implies a = f/,/a,. To guarantee that Gs() is 
nondegenerate, we follow the usual procedure (see the proof of 
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Theorem 4 for example): assume a mass point exists at rs, use zero 
profits to calculate its size, and then require it to be strictly less 
than 1. This yields Os < a,s, condition (i). 
Condition (ii) is also given by standard arguments regarding 
nonentry in the no security interest market. Using zero profits, we 
show for r > rs*, 
1 - Gs(r) = [(F + F')/aL(r(1 - 7r) - c - k)] - aj/2a2. 
Hence, for qN e [rN,N], 
(F + F')L[qN(l - r) - c 
- k] 
7re(qN) = - F, 
L{[(s -I N + q)( - r)- c - k] + Vkj 
and 




IN + qN)(1 - r) 
- c - k] + Vk}2 
Thus, Lemma 5 implies d7re(qN)/dqN > 0, and we need only guar- 
antee that re(lN) < 0. This, however, reduces to ,N > Os, condition 
(ii). Q.E.D. 
Theorem 14: Necessary and sufficient conditions for the market for 
loans with security interests to be competitive and that for loans 
without security interests to be noncompetitive are: 
(i) ON < a1s 
(ii) Vk - L(N - Is)(1 - 7r) < a1F'/[2a1s - (a1 + 2a2)f3N]. 
Proof: With the no security interest market noncompetitive and 
the security interest market competitive, the highest rate charged 
in the former must be 1N. Zero profits then gives a = ON /al. 
As usual, GN() cannot have a mass point at rN (see Theorems 9, 
11, and 12). Furthermore, expected demand at rs must equal s. 
Hence 
a {a, + 2a2[nN + (ns/2)] }=s, 
or, using nN + ns = 1 and a =- /al, 
nN = [(als/fN) - 1]/a2 
Hence, nN > 0 yields als > fN and nN < 1 yields a,s < 
fiN(a, + 2a2). The latter, however, is implied by Assumption 3'. 
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Hence, we have (i). 
Let tN be the minimum rate charged in the no security interest 
market. Then, zero profits implies 
a(a1 + 2a2nN)L[tN(1 - 7r) - c - k] - F = 0, 
or 
tN = [F/(2s - (a, + 2a2)aL] + c + k/(1 - r). 
Hence, tN > r* if and only if N(a, + 2a2) > als, the same con- 
straint associated with nN < 1. 
Consider, finally, entry into the security interest market above 
rs. Following the standard procedure, we have 
1 - GN(r) = t [F/aL(r(l - r) - c - k)] - al/2a2nN 
and 
F[L[qs(1 - r) - c - k] - Vkj 
re(qs) = -(F + F'). 
L[(N - Is + qs)(l - ir) - c -k] 
Thus 




- ls + qs)(l - r) - c - k]}2 
Lemma 5 then implies d7re(qs)/dqs < 0. Thus, we need 7re(ts) < 0 
or, after some algebra, 
Vk - L(lN - ls)(1 - r) < a,F'/[2a,s - (a1 + 2a2)3N], 
condition (ii). Q.E.D. 
Theorem 15: It is impossible for the market for loans without se- 
curity interests to be competitive and the market for loans with 
security interests to be noncompetitive. 
Proof: Firms could always enter the securities market at rs and 
earn strictly positive profits (see Theorems 9 and 11). Q.E.D. 
Theorem 16: Necessary and sufficient conditions for both markets 
to be noncompetitive are 
(i) (a, + 2a2)/N[Vk - (N - l,)(1 - 7r)L] > a1F' 
(ii) F' > ON[Vk - (IN - LS)(1 - 7r)L] 
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(iii) a,F' < [Vk - (IN - I,)(1 - ir)L][2a1s 
- 
(a, + 2a2) /N] 
Proof: The first step in this proof is to show that the maximum 
price in the no security interest market is IN and the maximum 
price in the security interest market is strictly less than ls. Suppose 
the opposite is the case (both IN and Is cannot be offered). As in 
Theorem 8, there can exist only one rate, say PN' such that both PN 
and Ps are offered, where Ps is defined by IN - PN = Is - pS. At PN, 
expected demand is a(a1 + 2a2ns) because PN is the highest rate in 
the no security interest market (and by assumption PN < IN). But 
expected demand at Ps is also c(a1 + 2a2ns). Hence, zero profits 
yields 
a(a1 + 2a2ns)L[pN(l -) - c - k - F 
= a(a + 2a2ns){L[ps(l - r) - c - k] - Vk - 
(F + F'). 
or 
a(a1 + 2a2ns) = F'/[Vk - L(lN - l,)(1 - )] 
Solving for ns, 
ns = [(F'/Za) - a]/2a2 
where Z = [Vk - L(IN - Is)(1 - )] 
We need 0 < ns < 1, or 
(a1 + 2a2)aZ > F' > a,aZ. (19) 
Next, let qN be the minimum rate in the no security interest mar- 
ket. It must be that qN > rN or entry at rs would yield strictly 
positive profits. But consider entry in the security interest market 
at qs, where qs is defined by 'N - qN = ls - qs. Zero profits at qN 
implies 
a(al + 2a2)L[qN(l - 7r) - c - k] - F = 0, 
or 
qN = {[F/a(a, + 2a2)L] + c + kj/(1 - r). 
Thus, 
re(qs) = a(a, + 2a,2)L[qs(l - 7r) - c - k] + Vk - 
(F + F') 
= a(a, + 2a2)tL[Is - N + qN)( - ) -c - k] +Vk 
- (F + F'). 
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Substituting for qN and requiring 7re(q) < 0 gives 
L(1s - N)(1 - r) + Vk < F'/ (a, + 2a2) 
or 
((a1 + 2a2)Z < F' 
which contradicts the left-hand inequality in (19); ns < 1. 
Thus, it must be that the maximum rate in the no security inter- 
est market is 1N and in the security interest market it is Ps, where 
Ps is defined as above. The minimum price in the no security inter- 
est market is PN, where PN and Ps satisfy 1, - Ps = IN - PN- 
As before, we can solve for expected demand at PN and Ps. Here 
we have that it equals cr(a1 + 2a2nN) and thus 
a(a, + 2a2nN) = F'/Z. 
Thus 0 < nN < 1 implies 
(a1 + 2a2)aZ > F' > alaZ (20) 
as in (19). It must also be that PN > rN. But PN is given by 
La(a, + 2a2nN)[pN( - 7r) - c - k] - F = 0, 
or 
PN = [(FZ/F'L) + c + k]/(l - ir). 
Thus, IN > PN > r if and only if 
fNZ < F' < sZ, (21) 
the first of these being equivalent to nN > 0 and the second to 
Assumption 3'. 
Two considerations remain: nondegeneracy of Gs(-) and entry 
above Ps or below PN. Concerning the former, suppose Gs(.) has a 
mass point at r*. Then, zero profits implies 
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at{a + 2a2[nN + ns(l - Gs(rs*))/2] = s, 
or 
Gs(rs*) = [2(a, + 2a2) - (s/a)]/[(a, + 2a2) - (F'/aZ)]. 
Thus, Gs(rs*) < 1 if and only if 
aF' < Z[2a1s - (a1 + 2a2)lN]. (22) 
Concerning entry above Ps, dre(r)/dr < 0 for r e [Ps, ls] (as in The- 
orem 12). For entry below PN, d-re(r)/dr > 0 for r e [r*,pN] (as in 
Theorem 13). Hence, zero profits at Ps and PN covers these two 
cases. Substituting a = Nl/al into (20), (21), and (22), and using Z 
Vk - (lN - l)/(1 - r)L gives the theorem. Q.E.D. 
These result can be summarized in the following Corollary. 
Corollary 2: 
(i) A competitive equilibrium in the market for loans with secur- 
ity interests with nN = 0 exists if and only if als < min t NS, }. 
(ii) A noncompetitive equilibrium in the market for loans with- 
out security interests with nN = 0 exists if and only if Os < N and 
Os < als. 
(iii) nN > 0 if and only if N < min m a1s, /s }. Furthermore, 
ns = 0 if and only if [Vk - L(N - lS)(1 - r)]lN(al + 2a2) < a1F'. 
These conditions are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. 
Proof: Parts (i) and (ii) follow from Theorems 10 and 13. The neg- 
ative of these cases is equivalent to iN < min {a, s,s}. The neces- 
sary and sufficient conditions for each of these cases reduce to: 
Theorem 12: ZfN(al + 2a2) < a,F' 
Theorem 14: Z[2als - (al + 2a2) 3N] < a,F' 
Theorem 16: ZON(al + 2a2) > a1F' 
F' > ONZ 
a,F' < Z[2als 
- (a1 + 2a2/N)], 
where Z = Vk - L(lN - is)(1 - ir). But F' > BNZ is equivalent to 
fiN < Os and this is implied by ,N < min [a,s,fs}. Furthermore, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for Theorem 16 which remain 
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are the negation of those for Theorems 12 and 14. Thus, when 
iN < min {as,gs}, one of the three cases must hold. Q.E.D. 
